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5FOREWORD
The accession of countries from Central and
Eastern Europe will bring about change in
many ways for the European Union. Even
before membership, the European Union
has already induced considerable changes
inside the candidate countries. At the do-
mestic level, the European Union has put its
mark on politics, economy and society.
Students and even more practitioners
of European politics know that the Euro-
pean Union is a multi-level political system
that cannot be regarded isolated from the
domestic sphere of policy making. Even to-
day civil servants and politicians from Bu-
dapest, Warsaw and other capitals of candi-
date countries quite regularly travel to
Brussels to consult and negotiate with actors
of EU institutions and their counterparts in
current member states on political issues
that have a direct effect on their home
countries. Compared to other “normal” in-
ternational organisations the European Un-
ion is very specific in its demands and af-
fects across policies domestic actors from
national down to the regional levels of pub-
lic service and government.
The overall catchword for these
manifold processes is “Europeanisation”.
We understand Europeanisation as a shift of
attention of all national institutions and
their increasing participation – in terms of
the number of actors and the intensity – in
the EC/EU decision-making cycle. EU Euro-
peanisation is about the resources in time,
personnel and money directed by the cur-
rent and future member states towards the
EU level. Over the last years, Europeanisa-
tion has become a prominent academic
concept that is based on empirical processes
in the political systems, notably in the
sphere of public administration and adds a
specific perspective to the analysis of inte-
gration processes. This leads to the overall
question about the impact of EU member-
ship on public administrations. In which
ways does the preparation for membership
already impact on domestic administrative
and policy-making structures? The candi-
date countries have already been drawn
into this EU multi-level system before they
actually accede to the European Union.
On this background the Institut für
Europäische Politik (IEP) and the Jean-
Monnet-Chair at the University of Cologne
started a project on the specific impact of
EU membership on public administrations
and the central executive in candidate
countries. At the IEP, Dr. Barbara Lippert
and Dr. Mathias Jopp are involved in the
project; at the University of Cologne, Gaby
Umbach, M.A., and Prof. Dr. Wolfgang
Wessels. The project is funded by the
Volkswagen-Stiftung. The project team
works together with partners in the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slo-
venia. The two papers we publish in this
working paper series are the result of this
fruitful and long-standing cooperation.
Dorota Pyszna from the Trans European
Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), Brussels,
and Krisztina Vida from the Institute for
World Economics, Budapest, focus on the
management of accession to the European
Union and the EU-related decision- and
policy-making structures in Poland and
Hungary respectively. They give us an in-
sight into the stages of Europeanisation of
the central administration in the two coun-
tries. They also provide readers with some
basic information on the transformation,
reforms and current development of public
administration and highlight the impact of
the EU. They describe in particular the
evolving government structures and key
actors with regard to EU policy-making.
Here the accession negotiations and the im-
plementation of the pre-accession strategy
of the European Union serve as empirical
background for their analysis.
Thus, the papers deal with key aspects
of our project on “Europeanisation of public
administrations in Central and Eastern
Europe in the process of transformation and
integration”. Our research is guided by sev-
eral hypotheses and observations. First of
all, we can see that there are stages of Euro-
peanisation in the candidate countries
which also affect the sphere of public ad-
ministration from the Europe agreements in
the early nineties up to the current mem-
bership negotiations. The EU pressures can-
didates to reform the national administra-
tions in anticipation of membership. That is
also why at the Laeken summit in December
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2001 the EU launched a specific action plan
to strengthen the administrative and judicial
capacity in the candidate countries. Current
weaknesses in implementing the acquis
communautaire and in having institutions
as well as skilled personnel in place are re-
garded as an Achilles heel of future mem-
bership. This might limit the policy making
capacities and the impact of the new mem-
bers on decision-making within the EU. But
it might also deteriorate the functioning of
the internal market and other policy areas
where the EU depends heavily on proper
implementation at the level of member
states. However, the EU does not offer a pre-
cise administrative target zone for the on-
going adaptation processes in candidate
countries. Overall one can say that antici-
pated EU membership has become a driving
force for administrative reform, but candi-
date countries still need medium-term
strategies for developing into efficient
multi-level players in the European policy-
making process (cf. for further reading Bar-
bara Lippert/Gaby Umbach/Wolfgang
Wessels: Europeanisation of CEE executives:
EU membership negotiations as a shaping
power, in: Journal of European Public Pol-
icy, 8:6 December 2001, pp. 980-1012,
also www.iep-berlin.de/forschung/moe-
europaeisierung).
Secondly, the pressures the EU puts on
would-be and current members are not
uniform but involve different mechanisms
of Europeanisation and modes of govern-
ance. National reactions and solutions with
regard to this demand to adapt do not con-
verge – not least because there is also no
single model of national administration in
the EU itself. This is true with regard to im-
plementation structures as well as the basic
institutional framework for EU policy mak-
ing. And so, when reading the contributions
by Dorota Pyszna and Krisztina Vida, one
can realise differences and national char-
acteristics as far as structures, actors and
the background of the political systems and
the traditions of public administrations are
concerned.
Thirdly, in the current membership
negotiations the central executives of the
candidate countries play a dominant role.
This could reinforce also a trend towards
the strengthening of officials at the expense
of other political actors in the EU policy
cycle after accession. This trend might
challenge democratic legitimacy and ac-
ceptance of EU membership in the new de-
mocracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
The papers presented in this docu-
ment look at selected aspects of the overall
Europeanisation of public administration in
Poland and Hungary. Both authors come to
the conclusion that the established systems
are not yet stable, but undergo changes as
we could witness after the general elections
in Hungary, in 2002 for example. The can-
didates also have to react to new demands
from the EU-system, so that Europeanisation
will not be completed with the moment of
membership but remains a challenge for
every member state. We therefore hope that
the readers will take an interest in the func-
tioning and specific conditions of the
evolving EU-policy making structures in
two key future members of the EU.
We are very grateful to the authors
for their contributions and to the whole
project team including our partners in the
candidate countries for their contributions
to the workshops in particular in Brussels
and Natolin (Poland) where we discussed
topics of the project over the last months.
We are also indebted to those experts in
Brussels and in the capitals of candidate
countries for sharing their assessments and
insights with us. Finally, we wish to thank
the Volkswagen-Stiftung for supporting the
research project and, of course, the Institute
for World Economics for including these
papers into its working paper-series. It is
another example of our excellent coopera-
tion on European integration over many
years which we will continue in the future.
Budapest/Berlin/Cologne, September 2002
András Inotai
Director
Institute for World Economics
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Mathias Jopp
Director
Institute for European Politics
Wolfgang Wessels
University of Cologne
Jean Monnet Chair
Chairman
TEPSA
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Dorota Pyszna*
The Management of Accession to the European Union – EU-
Related Decision and Policy-Making in Poland
ABSTRACT
The present paper concentrates on devel-
opments regarding the process of transfor-
mation of Polish public administration since
1989, with a special emphasis on institution
building and Poland’s administrative readi-
ness to cope with EU integration matters. In
particular the structures and the character
of policy-making are analysed with regard
to capacity to implement the acquis com-
munautaire. A major question remains if the
Polish public administration can guarantee
proper implementation of the EU rules and
if Polish civil servants are already prepared
to become integrated into the European
Administrative space. 1
Particular attention has been paid to
the institutional framework for accession
and to the actors involved in the EU-related
decision-making process, at all levels of
central administration. In fact, important
developments have been observed over the
last ten years, during which circles of public
administration dealing with EU affairs have
significantly increased: from a core expert
group to a significantly broader number of
civil servants. Additionally, Polish-specific
phenomena are a rotation of key-actors in-
                                                
* M. A., M. A. (European Studies), M.E.S. (College of
Europe/Natolin), Collaborator of the Trans European
Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) in Brussels and
member of the IEP-University of Cologne research
team on Europeanisation of public administration in
CEEC.
1 For the definition of the term refer to: B. Lippert, G.
Umbach, W. Wessels (2001), ‘Europeanisation of
CEE Executives: EU Membership Negotiations as a
Shaping Power’, Journal of European Public Policy,
Vol. VIII, No. VI, p. 980-1012 and SIGMA Paper
(1998), ‘Preparing Public Administrations for the
European Administrative Space’, SIGMA Papers No.
23, CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA/(98)39.
side the governmental structure and a cer-
tain elitism in dealing with EU issues.
The paper identifies major problems
which the Polish administration faces, such
as enforcement of reforms, difficulties with
strengthening of institutions, corruption in
the power circles and problems of the un-
derstaffing and underestimation of the civil
service. Finally, no one should neglect cul-
tural preconditions and questions of values
and post-communist mentality, which make
the speeding up the adaptation process dif-
ficult.
1) STARTING POINTS FOR EU
ACCESSION
The democratic reforms, which started in
1989, have focused on the transformation
of the political system as well as the mod-
ernisation of Poland’s economy. The process
of transformation of the Polish political and
economic system was from the very begin-
ning accompanied by an aspiration to get
closer to the EU. Very quickly the European
Union became a reference point and model
for democratisation, as Poland tried to reach
the Union’s political and economic stan-
dards.
EU membership requires a broad ad-
justment of economic and social systems. In
fact, the Polish transformation process is
greatly influenced by the need to adapt to
EU rules and decision-making processes.
Administrative capacity building is one of
8the most fundamental prerequisites for ac-
cession, since a well functioning institu-
tional framework is a horizontal prerequi-
site for all sectoral reforms and changes.
“Europeanisation” of public administration
can be understood as “a gradual process of
democratisation and also decentralisation
and comprehensive modernisation of public
administrations of Central European
States”.2 Reforms aimed at transformation
and modernisation of the public admini-
stration system are therefore a key element
of the process of Europeanisation.
Accession to the EU can be a success
only if the implementation of necessary re-
forms is fully achieved. Effective imple-
mentation of EU rules is the most difficult
issue on the way towards accession, because
of its relation to the process of rebuilding
institutional and regulatory structures. Only
a full implementation capacity will allow
Poland to become a fully-fledged decision-
maker in an enlarged Union.
The main aim of this paper is to make
reflections on the relationship between Po-
land’s aspirations to become a member of
the European Union and the reform of pub-
lic administration. Accession to the EU is
considered as the main priority of Poland’s
external policy. To reach this goal, the proc-
ess requires a quick and harmonious adap-
tation of Polish administration to deal with
EU policies at the national level, as well as
to participate actively in EU decision-
making in the future.
1.1. The political system
At the beginning of the 21st century, the
Republic of Poland is a democratic state
based on the rule of law and the principle of
social justice, where political rights such as
freedom of association and speech, protec-
tion of property and respect for privacy are
ensured.
                                                
2 A. W. Jabłonski (1997), ‘Europeanisation of Public
Administration in Central Europe. Poland in Com-
parative Perspective’, Final Report, NATO Research
Fellowship Report 1997, p. 19.
The new constitution adopted in 1997
has introduced a clear division of powers
between state institutions and created
greater transparency of the functioning of
the state. In Agenda 2000, the European
Commission stressed the importance of
democratic stability and began the moni-
toring of institutional developments in Po-
land. Since 1999 the European Commission
has stressed that Poland has achieved stabil-
ity of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities; one of the
political criteria laid down in Copenhagen.3
The Polish constitutional model is
based on the principle of separation of pow-
ers between the legislature, the executive
and the judiciary. The Council of Ministers
(government) is the primary executive or-
gan, whereas the President has limited
prerogatives in the executive. Poland has
traditionally been part of the continental
law tradition and the legal system is based
on a hierarchy of legal norms (constitution,
statutory laws, international agreements,
regulations issued by constitutional organs,
resolutions of the Council of Ministers and
local legal enactments).4
The possibility for accession to the EU
is laid down in the Polish constitution from
April 1997, which provides a framework
for integration with international organisa-
tions. According to Article 90 of the consti-
tution, the Republic of Poland may, on the
basis of an international treaty, hand over
the authorities of the state organs in some
matters to the international organisation or
to the international organ. This article cor-
responds to provisions existing in constitu-
tions of EU member states, which enable a
transfer of sovereignty.
                                                
3 European Commission (1999, 2000, 2001),
‘Regular Report on Poland’s Accession to the Euro-
pean Union’ Brussels, 1999, 2000 and 2001.
4 SIGMA (2000), Public Management Profiles of
CEEC: Poland, p. 3.
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1.2. Poland’s priorities with a view to EU
accession
EU membership is seen as the best guaran-
tee of consolidating Poland’s democratic
system founded on the principle of the rule
of law, with a market economy and friendly
relations with all its neighbours and other
European states. Accession to the EU will
ensure the irreversibility of the transforma-
tion process by strengthening links between
Poland and the EU member states.
As stressed in the National Strategy of
Integration, the economic advantages are
participation in the Single European Market
ensuring a free movement of goods, serv-
ices, persons and capital, access to struc-
tural funds, as well as the inflow of invest-
ment and new technologies.5
Poland wants to play an active role as
a future EU member, participating in the
activities of all EU institutions and in all
three pillars. This ambition is at the origin
of Poland’s negotiating policy aimed at
adopting all key policies at the moment of
accession e.g. the Common Agricultural
Policy, free movement of workers etc. The
engagement also includes the participation
in inter-governmental co-operation within
the EU, in the area of Common Foreign and
Security Policy and in the Justice and Home
Affairs. It sees EU membership as a way to
initiate policies and participate in decision-
making at the international level. This will
also allow Poland to have a positive influ-
ence to help solve strategic international
problems, which would not be possible out-
side the Union.6 Besides, the political benefit
lies in the building of closer individual, lo-
cal and regional ties between Poland and
the rest of Europe. Additionally, the country
has ambitions to belong to the “six big”
member states of the EU and to benefit from
                                                
5 National Strategy for Integration, Warsaw, 1997, p.
8.
6 Rada Ministrów (Council of Ministers) (2000),
‘Raport w sprawie korzysci i kosztow integracji RP z
UE’ (Rapport on Benefits and Costs of Poland’s inte-
gration with the EU), Warsaw, 26 July 2000, pp. 51-
53.
a particularly strong position in the EU de-
cision-making process.
Increasing proximity to the EU,
through consecutive stages since 1989, is
taking place in the context of relative insta-
bility and strong polarisation of the political
scene. However, Poland has attained a gen-
eral political consensus on EU accession that
is shared by both left and centre-right
groups. For more than ten years, consecu-
tive Polish governments have been working
on approximation of Polish law to the EC
rules, and, above all, to the requirements of
the Common Market. This implies not only
necessary structural changes in the public
administration, but also decentralisation of
competences and the setting up of decen-
tralised bodies and agencies. Finally, this
also entails changes in attitude and the
professional ethic of civil servants in order
to cope with EU affairs and the fight against
corruption.
Accession to the EU is contributing to
the speeding up of reforms. The aim of the
reform is not only to reshape the state after
more than 40 years of communist regime,
but also to attain as quick as possible the
level of current EU member states, in terms
of political standards and economic growth.
Politicians from the centre-right (demo-
cratic parties issued from the Solidarity
movement) and the left wing of the political
scene (post-communists) tend to use Euro-
pean integration as an argument to justify
the rationale for difficult internal reforms to
the public. As an example, a parallel intro-
duction of four reforms by the Buzek gov-
ernment in 1999 (administrative reform,
health reform, pension system reform and
education system reform) was explained to
the society as a prerequisite for EU acces-
sion. It has not been pointed out that the
main need for these reforms was an internal
one. At the same time, an ‘over-reliance’ on
the EU in legitimising the country’s reforms
frees the political class from the responsi-
bility for making political choices and pre-
vents the development of an adequate inter-
nal motivation for reforms. Following this
thinking, the European Union and its insti-
tutions are therefore supposed to care and
10
take responsibility for the difficulties caused
by the afore mentioned internal reforms.
1.3. Public support for enlargement
1.3.1 Public opinion
Integration with the EU is a goal generally
accepted by Polish society, as Poles see
themselves as firmly belonging to European
civilisation which is currently represented
by the European Union and its system of
values. In the early 90s public support for
EU membership was the highest of any
CEEC (more than 80 per cent of Poles were
in favour). However, since 1999 the num-
ber of supporters varies between 50 and 55
per cent. Most Poles agree that joining the
EU is the best scenario for Poland, which
results also from a lack of alternatives. In
July 2001, 53 per cent of Poles were in fa-
vour of European integration, 25 per cent –
against, whereas 22 per cent do not have an
opinion on this subject.7 It is interesting to
note that since April 2001 the number of
supporters has been relatively stable, num-
bers of opponents has decreased and the
number of undecided has increased.
The falling support for EU integration
is due to several factors. First the high level
of Polish support did not represent “a con-
scious and considered declaration of sup-
port”.8 Other aspects are lack of informa-
tion on costs and benefits of EU accession
and a ‘politicisation’ of the public debate.9
Lack of support can also mean the rejection
of the political elite, which is in favour of
                                                
7 CBOS, Public Opinion Poll, ‘Opinions of Polish
People on European Integration’, July 2001 and
literature on public opinion in Poland: A. Szczerbiak
(2001), ‘Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining
Support for EU Membership’, in: Journal of Common
Market Studies, 1/01 pp. 105-122 and M. Kucia
(1999), ‘Public Opinion in Central Europe on EU
Accession: The Czech Republic and Poland’, in: Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies 1/99, pp. 143-152.
8 A. Szczerbiak (2000), ‘Public opinion and Eastward
Enlargement. Explaining declining support for EU
membership in Poland’, Sussex European Institute,
SEI Working Papers  No. 34, p. 20.
9 Ibid., p.21.
integration. A long term analysis of public
support for joining the EU shows a signifi-
cant change of tendencies from the great
enthusiasm and widespread acceptance of
the early 1990s; to more reticence about the
idea in the period after Poland submitted its
membership application (in 1994).10
Initially, too high public expectations
about the benefits of EU accession and the
lack of enthusiasm about enlargement on
the part of EU member states increased the
euroscepticism of the Polish society. Other
main sources of euroscepticism are prag-
matism (distance and mistrust towards any
abstract political project), post-communist
mentality (economic interests are the most
important), provinciality (peripheral loca-
tion in Europe raises complex of inferiority)
and historical experiences (rejection by the
western world in the past). Political groups
against EU accession use different argu-
ments from the above list. The peasant radi-
cal party (Samoobrona) instrumentalises the
historical experiences argument as well as
pragmatism and the post-communist men-
tality argument. Fear of economic costs of
enlargement and mistrust towards a politi-
cal project are the most pronounced in this
group. On the other hand, the conservative
right-wing parties (League of Polish Fami-
lies – Liga Polskich Rodzin) stress losses in
terms of values and identity, loss of national
sovereignty and refer to the historical rejec-
tion. In the new Sejm, elected in September
2001, both eurosceptic parties are repre-
sented. They are active in the parliamentary
forum11 and effective in terms of influenc-
ing the public opinion.
However, according to the Applicant
Countries Eurobarometer 200112, Poland
remains one of the applicant countries
                                                
10 L. Kolarska-Bobińska (ed.) (2001), ‘Before the
great change. Polish public opinion and EU enlarge-
ment’, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, 2001, pp.
3-10.
11 Debate during the session of the JPC Joint Parlia-
mentary Committee Poland–EU, Warsaw, 4 Decem-
ber 2001.
12 European Commission, Applicant Countries Euro-
barometer 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/pub-
lic_opinion
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where public opinion support for EU inte-
gration is the highest (51 per cent of Poles
believe in Autumn 2001 that EU member-
ship for their country would be “a good
thing”), and 67 per cent of the respondents
would vote in a referendum on EU mem-
bership in favour of accession. Besides, the
majority of Poles (55 per cent) tend to trust
the European Union. All those numbers are
very surprising taking into account that
trust in state institutions is extremely low.
1.3.2. Polish society and the integration
process
The involvement of the Polish society,
measured by interest in politics, participa-
tion in the elections, and willingness to take
part in lawful demonstrations, is low. This
weak political involvement can be ex-
plained with regard to the mistrust of citi-
zens towards institutions as well as mistrust
of politicians. In comparison, among candi-
dates the highest involvement has been no-
ticed in the Baltic countries, whereas the
lowest is in Poland and Slovenia.13 It is not
possible, however, to say that political in-
volvement in the West is much higher than
in post-communist countries. Involvement
in politics is closely related to trust in insti-
tutions and their representatives, which is
dramatically low in Poland (see below).
A negative public assessment of the
competence and morality of political elites
is one of the most important features of the
Polish political system.14 This disappoint-
ment with politicians and democratically
elected representatives of Polish society
leads to public discontent (in form of
strikes, road blockages etc.) and rejection of
civil participation as such. The negation of
the local or national governing power has
led to rejection of policies that the political
                                                
13 See findings of the World Values Survey: R. Ingle-
hart (1999), ‘Trust, Well-Being and Democracy’, in:
M. Warren (ed.), ‘Democracy and Trust’, New York
and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999,
pp. 88-120.
14 J. Hausner, M. Marody (ed.) (2000), ‘The Quality
of Governance: Poland Closer to the European Un-
ion?’, EU Monitoring IV, Kraków, 2000, p. 48.
elites carry out, leading also to the negation
of EU integration policy.
2) STAGES OF EUROPEANISATION OF
THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN
POLAND
2.1. First steps and preconditions
Poland has inherited, thanks to its past, a
mixed model of public administration. After
regaining its independence in 1918, after
almost 150 years of inexistence of the state
(the partitions), the country adopted the
Austrian model of administrative proce-
dures and administrative courts, the Prus-
sian model of central and local governments
and the Russian model of financial institu-
tions.15 After the Second World War Poland
was administered by the central planning
method during the Communist period. At
that time, the administration was used for
the implementation of Communist Party
policy. Both the administration and the rule
of law increasingly came to be seen by the
public as instruments of political control.16
This situation is the root of a very negative
perception of Polish administration within
society.
Since 1989 the administration in Po-
land has changed in many ways. Reforms
aimed at decentralisation and de-
concentration started in 1990 and took a
course in two stages:
* First stage starting in 1990: the creation of
a new structure of public administration,
encompassing regional authorities of gov-
ernmental administration as well as
                                                
15 The Network of Institutes and Schools of Public
Administration in CEE (NISPAcee), Report on Poland;
http://www.nispa.sk/reports/Poland/Part1.htm
16 European Commission (1997), ‘Agenda 2000 –
Commission’s opinion on Poland’s application for
Membership of the EU’, 15 July 1997, p. 105.
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authorities of local self-government. One
of the most important steps was the intro-
duction of the first level of local authority,
i.e. the commune (gmina) in 1990 as well
as a certain decentralisation of compe-
tences.
* Second stage starting in 1999: including
the reform of local government, the con-
tinuation of the process of decentralisation
and deconcentration, the introduction of
new regional structures.17
The separation of political responsi-
bility and competence of officials consti-
tuted the major challenge during the first
stage of reform, whereas there were incen-
tives to separate the level of executive ad-
ministration from the structure of certain
ministries involved in the formulation of
policy and strategy of the state. “An un-
healthy mixture of the political sphere in
administrative structures and competence
of the government centre with executive
and management functions is the inheri-
tance of the previous system.”18
In January 1999, the second reform
entered into force and constitutes a gradual
process which will last for several years.
This reform reduced the number of regions
(voivodships) from 49 to 16 and it aimed to
decentralise Polish public authorities and
public finances as well as at reattributing
competences. Since then, a self-government
in Poland exists on three levels: the level of
voivodship (województwo), county (powiat)
and commune (gmina). The governmental
administration exists on two levels: on cen-
tral and on voivodship level, where it enjoys
very limited powers.
                                                
17 J. Zaleski (1999), ‘Podział i nakładanie się kom-
petencji administracji rządowej i trzech szczebli
administarcji samorządowejpo reformie ustrojowej
1999 roku’, in: M. Stec (ed.) ‘Reforma Administracji
Publicznej 1999 – dokonania i dylematy’, Instytut
Spraw Publicznych, Warsaw, 2000.
18 J. Pastwa (2000), ‘The Role of the Centre of Gov-
ernment. Reforms in Years 1996-2000 in Poland’,
OECD seminar “Government Coherence”, 6-7 Octo-
ber 2000, Budapest, p. 3.
2.2. Administrative reforms and EU-
related decision-making capacity
In practical terms, decentralisation does not
imply a transfer of competences in the field
of European integration: neither voivodship
nor other local units have any legal influ-
ence on the process of European integra-
tion.
Whereas the role of Polish regions in
EU-related decision-making is weak, the
European Union is considered as a driving
force for regionalisation: since 1986 (Single
European Act) European regions participate
actively in EU economic development, and
campaigns against unemployment and so-
cial exclusion. The role of the Committee of
the Regions (established by the Maastricht
Treaty) and regional representations in
Brussels consolidate the role of the regions
vis-à-vis the EU and national governments.
Poland has chosen a model of regionalisa-
tion similar to that applied in France and
the Netherlands (regions as part of a de-
centralised state).19 This model imposes sig-
nificant limits on the participation of the
regions in decision-making. The effective-
ness of the system will be measured in par-
ticular with regard to the future manage-
ment of structural funds after Poland joins
the EU.
The introduction of the new Civil
Service Law in 1999 established in Poland a
system of civil service complying with the
standards of political neutrality, impartiality
and professionalism. At least theoretically,
this act marks the end of transformation of
the Polish governmental administration,
from a strongly political apparatus to an
impartial and effective civil servants corpus,
acting in the public interest. The new law
defines consistent and unitary rules for the
civil service in government administration.
A peculiarity of the Polish situation is the
fact that the Civil service corps does not
include employees from local government
                                                
19 M. Zaborowska, ‘La réforme administrative et
territoriale polonaise dans le contexte européen’,
Notre Europe, September 2001, p. 16.
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administration and those from state institu-
tions which do not report to the Prime
Minister (e.g. the Chancellery of the Parlia-
ment, the President’s Chancellery, the Om-
budsman’s Office, etc.).20
The civil service corps is divided into
two groups: civil service employees (em-
ployed on the basis of the employment con-
tract) and civil servants (employed on the
basis of appointment).21 The second group
is recruited on the basis of an open compe-
tition. Information on vacancies was to be
made public and candidates selected on the
basis of their merits, ensuring transparency
and objectivity. A successful candidate
should be of Polish nationality, posses full
public rights, have the qualifications re-
quired by the civil service and have a good
reputation. In addition, the candidate
should have completed preparatory service,
at least two years of work experience in
public administration and must know at
least one foreign language.22 Work experi-
ence is not required in a specific area, but
generally in one of the branches of the cen-
tral administration. The higher the level
reached before the competition, the better
the chances are to be appointed to a higher
grade.
2.3. Europeanisation and its impact on
the public administration
The central administration plays a particu-
larly important role in initiating, monitor-
ing and coordinating Poland’s policy to-
wards the EU. Since 1989 the circle of in-
volved levels of administration has progres-
sively grown; at the very beginning only
high-ranking officials were involved in EU-
related decision-making. In particular after
the accession negotiations started, the need
                                                
20 Office of Civil Service (2001), Civil Service Sys-
tem; http://www.usc.gov.pl/en/100/130.html
21 Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Government
Information Centre,
http://www.kprm.gov.pl/central/inform.htm
22 Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Information on
civil service in Poland,
http://www.kprm.gov.pl/central/inform.htm
to employ medium-level civil servants in
line ministries to cope with EU affairs be-
came evident.
Poland did not create a new public
administration based on its historical expe-
riences, but has tried to develop new ad-
ministrative structures and procedures us-
ing experiences from traditional EU models.
This means in practice that the country
benefits from different models of EU mem-
ber states, since a unique European model
of public administration does not exist.23
However, the process of European integra-
tion leads to some standardisation of civil
services in EU member states and their con-
vergence to cope with EU standards and
procedures.24 In this regard, one has to
consider parallel developments of the proc-
ess of Europeanisation, a process which in
principle is not homogenous. Developments
of public administrations in the applicant
countries are similar, but modalities and
character of changes vary. In Poland, re-
forms of public administration and progress
on the way to EU membership can be ob-
served on the basis of gradual reforms,
which have taken place during consecutive
stages of the EU-Poland rapprochement
since 1989.
2.3.1. Pre-phase of the Europe Agreement
Diplomatic relations between Poland and
the European Communities were established
in 1988 and started with negotiations on
the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The
year 1989 was crucial in the mutual rela-
tions, since the Mazowiecki government has
signed the Trade and Cooperation Agree-
ment, the first agreement between Poland
and the European Community, which is a
treaty under public international law. That
year has been also important in terms of
Poland’s visibility in Brussels: the Polish
                                                
23 Cf. W. Wessels, A. Maurer, and J. Mittag, (eds.),
Fifteen into One? The European Union and Its Mem-
ber States. Manchester: Manchester University Press
(forthcoming 2002).
24 P. Ahonen, R. Polet, M. Kelly, T. Larsson and oth-
ers, Public administration in the new millennium:
some European scenarios, Maastricht, 17 February
2000, p. 9.
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Mission to the European Community was set
up, led by Jan Ku akowski, who became
Polish Chief Negotiator nine years later.
At that time, the European Commis-
sion launched the programme PHARE,
aimed at restructuring the Polish and Hun-
garian economies. This programme consti-
tuted a milestone in terms of administrative
adjustments over the last twelve years. As-
sociation negotiations were a crucial point
of the first phase of mutual political ap-
proximation. In terms of administrative
preparation to benefit from Community aid,
the post of Government Plenipotentiary for
European Integration and Foreign Assis-
tance was created in 1991.25 His responsi-
bilities included in particular initiation, or-
ganisation and coordination of measures
related to the process of integration with the
European Community and coordination of
foreign assistance.26
At the very beginning, Polish civil ser-
vants and in particular those who had to
deal with European affairs were very badly
informed about European integration, its
challenges and had a poor knowledge of the
institutions. Until 1994 line ministries were
not involved in EU matters. Only in Febru-
ary 1994 was the Government Plenipotenti-
ary requested by the Council of Ministers to
operationalise the organisational units and
posts for European integration in the min-
istries and central authorities.27 During this
phase of EU-Poland cooperation, only high-
ranking officials were trained in EU af-
fairs.28
The pre-phase of the Europe-
Agreement was a time of crystallisation of
pro-integrationist elites, involving experts
                                                
25 Resolution of the Council of Ministers, No 11/91
of 26 January 1991.
26 C. Blaszczyk (1998), ‘European Policy-Making in
Poland – Institutional and Political Framework’, in: B.
Lippert and P. Becker (eds.) (1998), ‘Towards EU-
Membership. Transformation and Integration in
Poland and the Czech Republic’, Bonn, 1998, Europa
Union Verlag.
27 PHARE (1999), ‘Evaluation of Phare Programmes
in Support of EU Integration and Law Approxima-
tion’. Final report – Poland, May 1999, p. 5.
28 C. Blaszczyk op. cit.
in EU policies – very often academics of the
past to take over the role of decision-makers
in EU-related matters. As an example, those
who appeared on the political scene when
negotiating the Association Agreement are
still visible on the political scene today and
continue to be among the key players in EU-
related decision-making over the past few
years, i.e. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Jan Ku a-
kowski (both from academia) and Andrzej
Olechowski.
2.3.2. The Europe Agreement
The Europe Agreement was signed in Brus-
sels on the 16th of December 1991. It con-
stitutes a basis for mutual relationship until
to date. The Europe Agreement, signed on
the Polish side by Leszek Balcerowicz, the
plenipotentiary of the Prime Minister, is an
act that “opened a new chapter in relations
between the EC and Poland”.29 This act es-
tablished an associate status of Poland to the
EU. The signing of the Europe Agreement
imposed on Poland the need for a speedy
establishment of institutions able to carry
out Community policies. At that stage, basic
structures of the coordination system with
regard to adaptation and integration proc-
esses were set up.30 In order to prepare a
long-term programme of approximation of
laws, the government plenipotentiary cre-
ated the Legal Expert Task Force. This unit
included representatives of the Legislative
Council, legal services of the parliament
and the office of the Council of Ministers,31
and the best specialists in the field of Euro-
pean law.32
The Europe Agreement and the docu-
ments which follow it, namely the White
Paper on the Internal Market33 (1995), the
                                                
29 D. Lasok (1995), ‘Zarys prawa Unii Europejskiej’,
Lublin, 1995, p. 203.
30 C. Blaszczyk (1998), op. cit., p. 132.
31 Since 1996 Chancellery of the Prime Minister.
32 PHARE (1999), ‘Evaluation of Phare programmes
in Support of EU Integration and Law Approxima-
tion. Final report – Poland’, May 1999, p. 3.
33 European Commission (1995), ‘White Paper on
the Preparation of the Associated Countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe for Integration into the In-
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Commission Questionnaire (1996) and – in
response – the Government’s National Strat-
egy for Integration (1997), are fundamental
elements of Poland’s preparation for mem-
bership. The White Paper was the first offi-
cial document to provide clear references to
sectoral administrative requirements, mak-
ing more limited statements on ‘horizontal’
capacities required to function in the EU.34
Following this document, the applicant
countries had to adapt their administrative
machinery and their societies to the condi-
tions necessary for the legal harmonisation
process.
At the stage of association Poland pre-
pared its institutions to establish direct links
with the EC institutions. According to
Blaszczyk, “association is a state of mutual
relations governed by the appropriate in-
stitutional structure which is additionally
linked with the European institutions. In
this context, the institutional adaptations
are supported by the general transformation
of the political and economic spheres. A
very important role belongs here to the
public administration system, whose tasks
result from its role to initiate, monitor and
coordinate the integration process”.35 Effec-
tively, strengthening of the role of civil ser-
vants in the European integration process
meant increasing of the technical role of
state employees, also at medium rank and a
certain limitation of political dimension of
cooperation with the EU institutions. Coop-
eration between Polish and EU civil servants
at deputy-director and senior executive of-
ficer level has become instrumental for the
implementation of the Europe Agreement,
whereas only matters of political impor-
tance are dealt with on a high ministerial
level.
2.3.3. The pre-accession strategy
                                                                         
ternal Market of the Union’, COM(95)164, Brussels,
1995.
34 A. J. G. Verheijen (2000), ‘Administrative Capacity
Development. A Race Against Time?’, Working
Documents of the Scientific Council for Government
Policy, W 107, 2000, p. 16.
35 C. Blaszczyk op. cit., pp. 139-140.
Stability of institutions guaranteeing de-
mocracy and the rule of law is one of the
most important criteria for accession estab-
lished at the Copenhagen European Council
of June 1993. Poland had to take them into
consideration when it applied for EU mem-
bership a few months later. Poland submit-
ted its official application for membership
in December 1994. However, all three
members of the Visegrad Group took the
first step in this direction two years later.
The so-called Memorandum of the Visegrad
Group36 was presented in Luxembourg in
1996 to the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the
European Community, and contained pos-
tulates on the beginning of accession nego-
tiations, a common agenda and integration
criteria. However, the document did not
contain any specific mention concerning
the need to redress the administrative ca-
pacity in the applicant countries.
The ‘pre-accession strategy’ for en-
largement was launched by the Commission
following the decisions of the European
Council in Copenhagen and focused on bi-
lateral arrangements between the EU and
applicant countries.37 The strategy was
composed of four main key instruments: the
Europe Agreement (liberalisation of trade),
the PHARE Programme, the Commission’s
White Paper on the Internal Market (1995),
as well as the so-called “structured dia-
logue”. The European Council in Essen in
December 1994 introduced this notion to
describe an operational framework for dis-
cussion.38 The aim of the Dialogue was to
provide a multilateral framework of minis-
terial meetings. The “structured dialogues”
foresaw in addition to the meetings of the
individual Association Councils agreed
upon in the framework of the Europe
Agreements, “the following meetings with
                                                
36 Memorandum of the Visegrad Group, 1996 –
www.visegrad.org (15/10/2001)
37 J. Hugues, G. Sasse and C. Gordon (2001), ‘The
Regional Deficit in Eastward Enlargement of the
European Union: Top Down Policies and Bottom Up
Reactions’, LSE Working Paper 29/01, p. 8.
38 European Council (1994), Presidency Conclusions,
Essen, December 1994, Annex 4.
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the associated partners on matters of com-
mon interests:
* Heads of State and Government: Annual
meeting on the margins of a European
Council meeting;
* Foreign Ministers: Twice yearly meetings
for discussion of the full scope of relations
with the associated countries, in particu-
lar the status and progress of the integra-
tion process.
* Ministers responsible for internal market
development, in particular Finance, Eco-
nomics, and Agricultural Ministers: An-
nual meeting.
* Transport, telecommunications, research,
and environment Ministers: Annual
meeting.
* Justice and/or Home Affairs: Twice yearly
meetings.
* Cultural Affairs, Education: Annual
meeting”.39
The “structured dialogue”40 served as
a vital forum for close exchanges of views
and an examination of progresses that Po-
land made with regard to the harmonisation
of its legislation and concentrated on con-
crete issues (e.g. internal market require-
ments) but neglected the role of adminis-
trative reform that is needed in Poland to
deal with EU policies. However, the Com-
mission rapidly realised the linkage between
sectoral adjustments and the role of public
administration: the adoption and imple-
mentation of the acquis requires a signifi-
cant reinforcement of administrative ca-
pacity. Consequently, an “administrative”
dimension was given to the strategy in Ma-
drid. The European Council in December
1995 concluded that the harmonious inte-
gration of the CEECs into the EU would re-
quire the adjustment of their administrative
                                                
39 Ibid.
40 On the structured dialogue refer to: P. Becker and
B. Lippert (1997), ‘Der Strukturierte Dialog der
Europäischen Union mit den Staaten Mittel- und
Osteuropas’, IEP-Berichte 1, Bonn, Institut für Eu-
ropäische Politik, 1997.
structures.41 In 1996, a government reform
reduced the number of ministries to 16 (in-
cluding the Chancellery of the PM). On EU
matters, the Inter Ministerial Committee for
European Integration (KIE) was created un-
der the authority of the Prime Minister, as
the supreme authority of state administra-
tion. It took over the responsibilities and
tasks of the Government Plenipotentiary for
European Integration and Foreign Assis-
tance and further EU-related decision-
making competences. At the same time,
European integration departments or units
were created in each ministry.
The Commission evaluated for the first
time the Polish administrative and judicial
capacity in its AGENDA 2000 of July 1997.
The document acknowledged efforts made
to reform Polish central administration and
established the fact that political independ-
ence of the civil service is generally re-
spected.42 However, the Commission no-
ticed significant weaknesses, inter alia with
regard to widespread tax evasion and in-
adequate enforcement mechanisms in areas
such as health, safety and environment. As
to the civil service, it was considered to be
understaffed at the policy level but over-
staffed at the level of routine administra-
tion.43 The Commission drew attention to
the problem of recruiting young high qual-
ity staff with language skills for the key
work on EU integration and, finally, to the
question of widespread corruption. At the
same time, whereas the general assessment
in AGENDA 2000 with regard to political
criteria is not very critical, the Commission
stressed the need to create appropriate
structures for vertical sectoral policies in
order to ensure an effective enforcement of
EC law and policies.
In the Partnership for Membership
from 1997, the Commission explicitly asked
for improving qualifications of civil servants
                                                
41 European Council (1995), Presidency Conclusions,
Madrid, December 1995.
42 European Commission (1997), ‘Agenda 2000 –
Commission’s Opinion on Poland’s Application for
Membership of the EU’, 15 July 1997, p. 105.
43 Ibid.
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in the field of EU integration and effective-
ness of public management.44
2.3.4. Accession negotiations
The European Council in Luxembourg,
which took place on 13 December 1997,
decided to begin accession negotiations with
six candidates. Negotiation talks consist of
31 chapters, of which Poland managed to
temporarily close 27 by September 2002.
Thus Poland made successful efforts in
catching up with a range of other candi-
dates. The new Polish government under
Miller intends to speed up negotiations and
to close the remaining chapters not later
than other candidates (by the end of
2002).45
When accession negotiations started,
the European Commission gave a critical
assessment of Polish administrative struc-
tures. The Regular Report 1998 pointed out
that “the absence of a coherent and effective
national policy for the recruitment, remu-
neration, training and development of the
Civil Service remains a significant con-
straint on Poland’s preparations for mem-
bership”.46 Secondly, the Commission ac-
centuated “ongoing problems in maintain-
ing institutional continuity at management
level due to changes of key administrative
personnel with successive changes in the
government”47 and a lack of a coherent
integrated pre-accession strategy for the
establishment of a professional public ad-
ministration. The Regular Report 1998 was
particularly severe in terms of progress in
administrative capacity building. It empha-
sised how little progress had been made in
several key areas for the implementation of
the acquis (in particular the Single Market).
Implementation of the acquis, which im-
plied setting up of governmental or non-
                                                
44 European Commission (1997), ‘Partnership for
Membership’, 1997.
45 Cf. speech of the Prime Minister Miller in the
Polish Parliament, 20 October 2001.
46 European Commission (1998), ‘Regular Report
from the Commission on Poland’s Progress towards
Accession’, November 1998, p. 41.
47 Ibid.
governmental bodies or agencies such as the
Polish Centre for Testing and Certification,
the Office of Public procurement or the
Commission of Securities and Exchanges
has not been followed by an operationalisa-
tion of those entities.48 Weak familiarisation
with EU practice, understaffing, lack of
transparency, inadequate resources and
skills of regulatory bodies are quoted as
main weaknesses which make it impossible
to enforce EU standards effectively. The
same line of criticism was maintained in the
1999 Regular Report.
The key document of EU-Poland rela-
tions, the 1999 Accession Partnership, set
out in a single framework the priority areas
for further work to be done on Poland’s way
towards EU membership. The reinforcement
of administrative and judicial capacities are
the source of the most pressing short-term
and medium term priorities.49 Short-term
priorities refer basically to the management
and control of EU funds and include the
introduction of a complete legislative
framework for internal and external finan-
cial control, and the setting up of a central
organisation within the government for
harmonising internal audit and control
functions. The adoption of a fast-track pro-
cedure for EU legislation and the strength-
ening of the administrative capacity for in-
ternal financial control at regional level
were defined as medium-term priorities. In
fact, all these aspects were taken up by the
Polish government and concrete results,
such as the speeding up of legislative proce-
dures to adopt EU law, were clearly visible
one year later.
The generally positive Regular Report
2000 paid less attention to the specific
question of adaptation of public admini-
stration. It concentrated on the introduction
of a new regional administrative structure
in Poland and the difficulties of its enforce-
ment, basically related to financial aspects
of its successful implementation.50 The Re-
                                                
48 Ibid., p. 43.
49 Poland: 1999 Accession partnership, p.1. Legal
provision: OJ L 85, 20.03.1998, p. 1.
50 European Commission, Regular report 2000, Po-
land, November 2000.
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port on the realisation of the National Pro-
gramme for Preparation of Membership
(NPPM) in 200051 stresses steps which were
taken on the way to implement EU provi-
sions, mainly with regard to administrative
capacities to manage pre-accession funds
and prospectively the structural funds. The
Council of Ministers adopted the national
strategy of regional development, which
defines regional competences.52
The stage encompassing accession ne-
gotiations shows noticeable developments
and the most rapid and effective changes in
Polish public administration with regard to
EU-related decision-making. The progress is
basically related to the introduction of the
necessary legislative framework, e.g. for
administrative reform and civil service law,
but is also related to the enforcement meas-
ures. Some EU officials tend to stress an in-
creased efficiency of Polish administration,
good preparedness of key civil servants to
deal with EU affairs as well as their know-
how regarding EU policies and law. The
main problem in this respect remains a gap
between the “elite” of civil servants and the
rest. Not surprisingly, the best-educated
people within the line ministries, who are
able to work in foreign languages, are
dealing with EU integration. Knowledge of
foreign languages is the basic prerequisite
to attend professional training in EU af-
fairs.53
Regular Reports, the Accession part-
nership as well as the NPPM contribute sig-
nificantly to speed up necessary reforms
that Poland has to carry out.54 The NPPM
attaches great importance to the proper
sequence of adjustment measures and sets
Poland’s priorities to increase effectiveness
of the public administration: creation of an
                                                
51 The report on the realisation of the NPPM, adopted
by the Council of Ministers on 20.04.2001.
52 National Strategy of Regional Development in
2001-2006, Warsaw, 2000.
53 Interview with a medium-ranking Polish civil
servant, November 2001.
54 Narodowy Program Przygotowania do
Czlonkostwa (NPPC) – National Programme of
Preparation for Membership in the EU (NPPM),
Warsaw, 1998 (adopted by the Council of Ministers
on 23.06.98).
effective internal financial control system
within the public administration, prepara-
tion of the institutional framework aimed at
using of the EU financial support and re-
sources from the structural funds after ac-
cession as well as creation of a institutional
framework for conducting the regional
policy, including implementation of re-
gional pilot projects.55
On the other hand, in the Accession
Partnership from 1999 the Commission
fully recognised a need to create appropri-
ate structures and modernise existing
ones.56 That is why during the period 2000-
2006, 30 per cent of PHARE resources are
focussed on institution building. ‘Institution
building’ includes all measures to help the
candidate countries to develop the struc-
tures, strategies, human resources and
management skills needed to strengthen
their economic, social, regulatory and ad-
ministrative capacity.57 The programme’s
most crucial areas are public finance, the
cadastre, tax administration, transport, in-
surance supervision, energy market regula-
tion, promotion of NGOs, SME and export
development, regional policy and statis-
tics.58 Institution building support is en-
sured in particular through twinning ar-
rangements between ministries, institutions,
professional organisations, agencies, Euro-
pean bodies, and regional bodies. With al-
ready more than 80 pre-accession advisers
being sent to Poland, twinning arrange-
ments for institution building have reached
a considerable stage of development.59 In
2001 the Commission stressed that a total of
372 twinning projects, primarily in the
fields of agriculture, environment, public
finance, preparation for the management of
the structural funds and justice and home
affairs have been funded by the Community
                                                
55 Cf. NPPC – NPPM, op. cit., p. 4.
56 Poland 1999 Accession partnership, p. 6.
57 Ibid., p. 11.
58 European Commission, Regular Report 2001, p.
10.
59 Interview with a senior official of the European
Commission, TAIEX office, October 2001.
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between 1998-2000.60 The last example
means in practice the improvement of cus-
toms service and its administrative capacity,
including protection of borders. Imple-
menting measures started in 1998 with the
setting up of the multi-disciplinary com-
mittee responsible for border management.
A new body, the Border Guard has been
assigned with managing of Poland’s exter-
nal borders. Consequently, the number of
staff has been increased at both national
and local level (a national measure) and due
to the twinning programme, a proper
training has been ensured. However, the
process of implementation of a new policy is
much more difficult. The European Parlia-
ment observed in September 2000 that the
Border Guard on the eastern frontiers is
under-performing, owing to a lack of ade-
quate equipment and infrastructure.61 They
are not limited to actors working in public
central administration, but also benefit re-
gional and local authorities. Next to twin-
ning arrangements, PHARE offers training
for civil servants in the form of workshops,
seminars and study visits.
Speeding up of the legislative process
does not imply in practice a successful im-
plementation of the EU acquis. The 2001
Commission’s Regular Report stresses that
the disparity between progress in the adop-
tion of legislation and the reinforcement of
administrative capacity is reflected in the
extent to which the short-term priorities of
the accession partnership have been ad-
dressed.62 In particular certification, fish-
eries and regional policy, social policy,
customs and justice and home affairs are
the main areas in which continued efforts
are needed to set up or strengthen adminis-
trative capacities.63
                                                
60 European Commission, Regular Report, 2001, p.
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61 European Parliament, Report on Poland’s applica-
tion for membership of the European Union and the
state of negotiations, A5-0246/2000, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security
and Defence Policy, Rapporteur: Jas Gawronski, 20
September 2000, p. 12.
62 European Commission, Conclusions of the Regular
Report 2001: Poland, 13 November 2001.
63 Ibid.
At the stage of accession negotiations
the Buzek government started to pay atten-
tion to the social dimension of the integra-
tion process. This fact has without doubt
important consequences for the implemen-
tation of the acquis. Democratic dialogue on
ongoing political processes between gov-
ernment, state administration, professional
groups and civil society did not exist in Po-
land during communist rule. As to the pub-
lic opinion concerning the accession proc-
ess, the positive attitude towards EU mem-
bership strongly depends on the integration
of civil society into the official information
policy. The cooperation with social partners
is realised through activities of the National
Council of European Integration and branch
consultation councils. The National Council
of European Integration was set up in De-
cember 1999 by the Prime Minister64 to
support social dialogue in the field of Euro-
pean integration. A Regulation of the Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers from Feb-
ruary 2002 sets a new framework for the
activities of the National Council of Euro-
pean Integration, stressing the role of terri-
torial consultations in particular in rural
areas.65
In April 2002 the Polish government
issued a report on Poland’s administrative
adjustments to cope with the requirements
of EU membership.66 This document clearly
recognises problems and shortcomings the
Polish administration needs to overcome, in
particular in such areas as regional policy,
agriculture, environmental protection, fish-
eries, transport and justice and home af-
fairs. The report identifies improvement of
human resources, establishment of appro-
                                                
64 Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, Departament
Analiz Programowych (2001), ‘Współpraca admin-
istracji rządowej z organizacjami pozarządowymi w
2001 r.’, Raport, Warszawa, czerwiec 2001,
www.kprm.gov.pl
65 Regulation No. 20 of the President of the Council
of Ministers of 11 February 2002 on the National
Council of European Integration.
66 Report on the institutional adjustments needed in
Poland to cope with the requirements of EU mem-
bership (Raport w sprawie dostosowań instytucjon-
alnych w Polsce do wymogów członkostwa w Unii
Europejskiej), adopted by the Committee for Euro-
pean Integration on 10.04.2002.
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priate organisational structures and proce-
dures as well as adjustment of present in-
stitutions in terms of competences as major
government’s priorities for 2002 and 2003.
A detailed sectoral analysis of the state of
preparation of Polish administrative struc-
tures at the central and local level as well as
a well-defined plan of action will certainly
be an important instrument for necessary
reforms to be carried out before Poland
joins the European Union.
2.3.5. Accession and beyond
At the Gothenburg Summit in June 2001,
EU leaders set the objective that the first
wave of candidates should enter before the
next elections to the European Parliament in
2004.67 The Summit in Laeken under the
Belgian Presidency confirmed that objective
and a possibility of accession of a group up
to ten candidates including Poland. At the
same time, the European Council stressed
that “the candidate countries must continue
their efforts energetically, in particular to
bring their administrative and judicial ca-
pabilities up to the required level”.68
The heads of State and Governments
present in Laeken asked the Commission to
submit a report on the implementation of
the plan of action for strengthening institu-
tions to the Seville European Council.69 In
June 2002 the Commission drafted a report
on action plans for administrative capacity-
building in the candidate countries.70 The
document will certainly confirm the appli-
cants’ need of unconditional adoption of
legal principles of administrative law com-
mon to the member states, and defined by
the European Court of Justice.71 Reliability
and predictability (legal certainty), open-
                                                
67 European Council (2001), Presidency Conclusions,
Gothenburg, June 2001.
68 European Council (2001), Presidency Conclusions,
Laeken, December 2001.
69 Ibid.
70 Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen quoted in:
Uniting Europe No. 185 – 6/05/2002, p. 3.
71 SIGMA Papers (1999) No. 27, European Principles
for Public Administration, CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA
(99)44/REV1, p. 8.
ness and transparency, accountability as
well as efficiency and effectiveness are par-
ticularly important principles in the juris-
prudence of the ECJ. Implementation of the
rules mentioned before is a particularly dif-
ficult task related to the civil service stan-
dards.
In terms of public administration, EU
accession in 2004 would mean a mobilisa-
tion of civil service to respond to the chal-
lenges of the EU decision-making. A consid-
erable number of Polish civil servants will
be delegated to Brussels, to work within EU
institutions. Open questions are: their ability
to adapt to a specific political culture, dif-
ferent from the Polish one, the quality of
work, the knowledge of foreign languages
etc. Besides, will a “brain-drain” to Brussels
damage public administration in Poland or
perhaps improve it because of a more ex-
tensive exchange between the European
Commission and Polish institutions?
At least theoretically, accession to the
EU may take place only if all Copenhagen
criteria are fulfilled. However, one can ex-
pect that the process of adaptation of CEE
administrations to EU standards will con-
tinue even after accession. It would be de-
sirable that the EU technical assistance pro-
grammes aimed at increasing Polish ad-
ministrative capacity would not stop at the
moment of accession, but would continue
beyond the current PHARE framework
(2000-2006).
3. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES FOR
EU-RELATED DECISION-MAKING
Particularly since the entry into force of the
Europe Agreement, a continuity of changes
is perceived in the EU-related decision-
making. Progress is observed in terms of
increased efficiency, better coordination
between institutions involved in EU-related
decision-making as well as a progressively
clearer division of key competences.
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3.1. The setting up of political and min-
isterial structures
The entering into force of the Europe
Agreement in 1994 was the milestone in the
process of adjustment of Polish administra-
tion to EU oriented policy. It implied the
creation of joint EU-Poland institutions
(Association Committee, Association Coun-
cil, Parliamentary Committee) and imposed
mutual obligations on the two partners.
However, the basic structures of the coordi-
nation system with regard to the rap-
prochement with the EU were set up since
1991.72 The function of the Government
Plenipotentiary for European Integration
and Foreign Assistance was established
during the negotiations on the Europe
Agreement in January 1991. Its responsi-
bilities included initiating, organising and
coordinating measures related to the proc-
ess of adaptation and integration with the
EU.73 The Committee for European Integra-
tion took over the responsibilities of the
Government Plenipotentiary in 1996 and
has been given increasingly important ex-
ecutive competences in the system of central
administration. Until October 2001, the
committee – headed by the Prime Minister
himself – executed its tasks through the
Office of the Committee for European Inte-
gration (see: Graph 1).
After the setting up the Committee for
European Integration, the number of bodies
involved in European policy increased, and
presented several problems of internal co-
ordination. The committee in a certain sense
diminished the role of the Minister of For-
eign Affairs, which risked fragmenting Pol-
ish foreign policy. Some experts argue that
a complex administrative structure has
never led to an overlapping of competences
between the Committee for European Inte-
gration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
                                                
72 C. Blaszczyk (1996), ‘European Policy-Making in
Poland. Institutional and Political Framework’, in: B.
Lippert, P. Becker (eds.) (1998), ‘Towards EU-
Membership. Transformation and Integration in
Poland and the Czech Republic’, Europa Union Ver-
lag, 1998, p. 132.
73 Ibid.
since the first was responsible for EU policy
at the internal, national level, whereas the
second ensured representation of Poland’s
foreign policy abroad.74 However, this
opinion simplifies the overall situation, in
particular since the beginning of accession
negotiations, when negotiation competences
were divided between three bodies (MFA,
Chancellery of Prime Minister, Office of the
Committee for European Integration). It is
important to stress that the number of bod-
ies involved does not reflect the number of
actors involved. A high degree of centrali-
sation, and importance of few key-actors
remain key characteristics of the Polish ad-
ministration taking part in EU-related deci-
sion-making. For example in the years
1997-2001, there were no more than four
key-actors and principal references: Jacek
Saryusz-Wolski, Jaroslaw Pietras, Pawel
Samecki and Jan Kułakowski (Chief Nego-
tiator), all of them political actors on the
highest level.
3.2. The role of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs75
The elections of September 2001 introduced
substantial changes to the government
structures involved in EU-related decision-
making. The winning party, the Democratic
Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokra-
tycznej – SLD) formed a coalition govern-
ment with the Peasant Party (Polskie Stron-
nictwo Ludowe – PSL), led by Leszek Miller
as Prime Minister. In the coalition’s com-
mon declaration, this new government set
the accession to the EU as a strategic goal
for Poland and stressed its intention to ac-
complish this objective as soon as possible.
One of the first declarations of the new
Prime Minister concerned the incorporation
of a significant part of the Office of the
Committee for European Integration (UKIE)
into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Until
that point, there were three centres of Euro-
                                                
74 Interview with a Polish high-ranking civil servant,
October 2001.
75 See: Graph 3.
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pean decision-making: the Office of the
Committee for European Integration, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of
the Chief Negotiator in the Chancellery of
the Prime Minister. The new shift of com-
petences finally encompasses only two as-
pects: modification of the statute of the
UKIE76 and reduction of the number of de-
partments and increasing of competences of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a result,
the UKIE is practically subordinated to the
MFA, and linked to it by a “personal union”.
The Secretary of the Committee for Euro-
pean Integration is at the same time Secre-
tary of State in the MFA (Danuta Hübner).
Originally, reforms were supposed to go
further, as Prime Minister Miller intended
to create a separate Ministry of European
Affairs. Even if the introduced changes are
less broad than it was announced, the re-
form simplified the existing model and
helped to avoid overlapping competences in
the field of European integration.
Under the new structures, the Prime
Minister continues to be the Chairman of
the Committee for European Integration.
This will give him the position of the most
powerful decision-maker in the field of EU
integration. Thereby, the decision-making
competences with regard to Europe will be
concentrated close to the Prime Minister.
One of the most important personal changes
was a change of the Chief Negotiator. In
charge since 1998 when the accession ne-
gotiations started, Jan Kułakowski was re-
placed by Jan Truszczyński, Head of the
presidential Office for European Integration
and until February 2001 Polish Ambassador
to the EU. At the same time, two key actors
in the negotiation process linked with the
former government will keep their posi-
tions: Jerzy Plewa as a Deputy Minister of
                                                
76 Cf. Dziennik Ustaw (Official Journal) No 133, al.
1498. In consequence of structural changes the
number of departments has been reduced. Since
November 2001 there are the following departments
in the UKIE: EU law, Integration policy, Economic
and Social Analysis, Foreign Aid, Social Communica-
tion, European Information, Translation and Docu-
mentation, European Affairs, European training,
Support of the Committee for European Integration.
Agriculture and Jarosław Pietras – Secretary
of the Negotiating Team.
In its first session on the 20th of Octo-
ber 2001, the Council of Ministers modified
the Resolution on the Plenipotentiary of the
Government for Accession Negotiations. So
far the plenipotentiary of the government
used to be the State Secretary in the Chan-
cellery of the Prime Minister. At the same
time, his competences and responsibilities
overlapped with those of the Foreign Min-
ister. The modified law remedies this in-
compatibility and places the plenipotentiary
within the structure of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. This Resolution77 regulates
competences and responsibilities in the pro-
cess of accession negotiations.
The change of government in fall
2001 did not provoke substantial policy
changes and did not have a major impact on
Poland’s aspirations vis-à-vis the EU. The
left wing has the ambition to bring Poland
into the EU during its mandate. At the same
time, only a few main actors dealing with
EU-related decision-making kept their posts
after the new government took office, and
the changing of the key-personnel obvi-
ously impacted on the continuity of the pro-
cess. Only the above mentioned Jaros aw
Pietras, Under-Secretary of State in the
UKIE, continues in the same role. Pawel
Samecki, who kept his position as Under-
Secretary of State in the UKIE after the
change of government in October 2001,
resigned in January 2002.
On the 15th of November 2001, the
Council of Ministers adopted a document
entitled “European Strategy of the Govern-
ment”78 The document defines the govern-
ment’s objectives on the way to EU mem-
bership, such as speeding up of the legisla-
tive process, closing of negotiations in
2002, participation of the civil society in the
                                                
77 Communiqué of the Council of Ministers, Chan-
cellery of the Prime Minister, Government Informa-
tion Centre (CIR), Warsaw, 20 October 2001.
78 Communiqué of the Council of Ministers, Warsaw
15 November 2001, http://www.kprm.gov.pl/ ar-
chiwum/komunikaty2001/rm.htm
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accession process and participation in the
debate on the future of Europe.
Miller’s government adopted a project
of law on changes in central administra-
tion,79 which consists basically of reducing
the number of bodies or consolidating some
of them. Firstly, the position of political ad-
visers in line ministries will be abolished
and reduced in the Chancellery of the Prime
Minister. The aim is to reduce the number
of politicians in the central administration.
The changes in the administrative structure
are supposed to clarify competences, better
coordinate the government’s activities, im-
prove transparency of decisions and pro-
mote an open social dialogue. Another new
project stipulates an amendment of the law
on the Council of Ministers from 199680
and its objective is to separate decision-
making functions of the government from
preparation of analysis, prognosis and pro-
grammes. This means in practice the reduc-
tion of the number of bodies subordinated
to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister
will directly control only the government
Centre (Chancellery of the Prime Minister,
Government Centre of Strategic Studies,
Government Centre of Legislation), the Of-
fice of Competition and Consumer Protec-
tion, the Central Statistical Office and the
Special Services. Such reduction of direct
control does not mean weakening of the
‘power position’ of the Prime Minister and
implies a concentration of political key
competences to the detriment of manage-
ment aspects of governance. More than
nineteen central administration bodies have
been or will shortly be abolished.81 Addi-
                                                
79 First reading of the draft law on changes in the
organisation and functioning of central organs of
public administration, including subordinated units,
took place in the Polish Sejm on the 1st of December
2001, www.sejm.gov.pl
80 Project of amendment of the Law on organisation
and functioning of the Council of Ministers and on
competences of line ministers, from 8/08/1996, and
of the law on departments of government admini-
stration from 4/09/1997.
81 E.g. General Director of Public Roads, Committee
of Cinematography, National Office for Control of
Insurance, President of the Office of the Sport Com-
mittee, President of the National Employment Office,
Office for Control of Pension Funds, General Cus-
tionally, such agencies as Construction and
Exploitation of Highways, Technology, Pri-
vatisation and Reserves of Sanitary Articles
will be abolished.
To conclude, the reforms from Octo-
ber/November 2001 contributed to a
stronger politicisation of the EU-related
management and to a concentration of
power for the President, the Prime Minister
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (all from
the Democratic Left Alliance). This concen-
tration of power on one side of the political
scene is accompanied by a “political un-
ion”82 of governmental institutions dealing
with European integration (the MFA and the
UKIE). According to the Minister for Euro-
pean Integration Hübner, a “technical un-
ion” of these institutions will take place in
the future when a European secretariat will
be set up.83 In consequence, the role of the
Committee for European Integration (KIE)
as an open forum for EU-related decision-
making has been significantly reduced. The
regular meetings of the KIE became less fre-
quent and a statutory participation of the
representatives of opposition in its works is
no more ensured. Only three independent
experts were invited to become members of
the KIE.84 At the same time, during its first
meeting after the change of the govern-
ment, the Committee for European Integra-
tion decided on the personal strengthening
of the institutions involved in the imple-
mentation of the acquis.85 Another impor-
tant feature of changes that occurred in
Poland in Fall 2001 is the reduction of the
number of ineffective and old-fashioned
agencies, partly remains from the commu-
nist system, as well as a modernisation of
                                                                         
toms Inspectorate, National Atomic Energy Agency,
etc.
82 Term used by Minister Danuta Hübner, quoted in
www.euro.pap.com.pl on Wednesday, 16 January
2002.
83 www.euro.pap.com.pl on Wednesday, 16 January
2002.
84 Jan Kułakowski, former Chief Negotiator and Jacek
Saryusz-Wolski, former Secretary of State for Europe
accepted to join the Committee for European Inte-
gration “ad persona”.
85 Cf: Statement of the Committee for European Inte-
gration, 17 October 2001.
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the structure of employment in the public
administration by means of strengthening
operational personnel in some institutions
and reducing the staff in other ones.86
3.3. The overall institutional framework
for EU-related decision-making:
sketching the picture
EU-related decision-making in Poland en-
compasses institutional coordination at sev-
eral levels: internal adjustments, law ap-
proximation, accession negotiations, man-
agement of pre-accession funds as well as
administrative coordination resulting from
the Europe Agreement. Several institutions
are involved in the EU integration policy.
However, their respective roles and impor-
tance vary according to the current political
situation. Core persons and institutions re-
sponsible for EU-related decision-making
are the following:
* The Prime Minister
* The Secretary of State for European Inte-
gration
* The Committee for European Integration,
supported by the Office of the Committee
for European Integration
* The Minister of Foreign Affairs
* The Negotiation Team, with the Govern-
ment Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Nego-
tiations to the European Union, usually
known as Chief Negotiator
* The Inter-Ministerial Team for the
Preparation of Accession Negotiation with
the European Union (“Inter-Ministerial
Team”).
* The Parliament: lower chamber the Sejm
and upper chamber the Senate
Reforms introduced by the Miller gov-
ernment in Autumn 2001 tend to reduce
the importance of the Office of the Com-
mittee for European Integration (UKIE).
                                                
86 Rzeczpospolita, ‘Mniej urzedow, mniej agencji’,
28/11/2001.
 Since October 2001, the structure
coordinating Poland’s European policy, in-
cluding the UKIE, is called “European Sec-
retariat”. However, this name has never
been officially adopted and has not been
mentioned in any legal act issued after this
date. Danuta Hübner, Minister of European
Affairs, is the head of the “European Secre-
tariat”. She is responsible for the whole in-
tegration policy as Deputy Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Head of the UKIE and Secretary
of the Committee for European Integration.
The Chief Negotiator as well as two Under-
secretaries of State in the UKIE are also
members of the Secretariat.
3.3.1. The Prime Minister
The position of the Prime Minister is defined
in Art. 148 of the Constitution. He manages
the work of the Council of Ministers, rep-
resents the Council of Ministers and is the
official superior of employees of the gov-
ernment administration. Over the last few
years the role of the Prime Minister as a key
person in all questions concerning the
European integration has been constantly
increasing. As the chairman of the Com-
mittee for European Integration he influ-
ences Poland’s policy towards the EU,
adopts the guiding decisions relating to the
negotiation process and appoints the Nego-
tiation Team for Poland’s Accession Nego-
tiations with the European Union. Since
1989 Poland has had ten prime ministers
and almost all of them left their mark on
direction and speed of the accession proc-
ess. The Prime Ministers participated in the
European Council meetings with the Heads
of State and Government of applicant
countries.87 In fact, the objective of these
meetings was to set up as a forum for politi-
cal consultation on issues of common inter-
est to the EU member states and the candi-
date countries. The President of the Council
of Ministers also participates in the Euro-
pean Conference, which is held at both
ministerial and head of state level.
                                                
87 For example on 7/12/2000 in Nice, Agence
Europe; 9/12/2000 or on 14/12/2001 in Laeken,
Agence Europe 17/12/2001.
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The Prime Minister Buzek
(1997/2001) set up the National Council
for European integration, as a consultative
body subordinated to the Prime Minister,
consisting of 47 advisors and experts from
NGOs, research institutes and interest
groups. Its main function was to support the
communication policy of the Government
with respect to accession and to advise the
Prime Minister on sensitive political issues
related to EU accession.88 After the change
of government in Autumn 2001, this con-
sultative body involving experts independ-
ently of their political alignment has un-
fortunately not been re-established.
3.3.2. The Committee for European Inte-
gration
Established in August 1996,89 the Commit-
tee for European Integration has been the
leading body responsible for co-ordination
of Polish integration policy. An additional
office, called the Office of the Committee for
European Integration (UKIE) has been cre-
ated to support its activities and to execute
its tasks.
The main goals of the Committee are:
planning and co-ordination of Poland’s in-
tegration policy and co-ordination of the
policies of other organs of the state admini-
stration in the area of foreign aid. The UKIE
also received competences for implementing
and carrying out the Europe Agreement.
Since July 1998, as a result of internal dis-
sent at the level of high-ranking officials,
the Prime Minister became the head of the
Committee (Buzek). The Committee consists
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Min-
ister of Internal Affairs and Administration,
the Minister of Finances, the Minister of
Economy, the Minister of Labour and Social
                                                
88 M. Brusis, J.A. Emmanouilidis (2000), ‘Negotiating
EU Accession: Policy Approaches of Advanced Can-
didate Countries from Central and Eastern Europe’,
p. 10.
89 Cf. Dziennik Ustaw (Official Journal) from 1996
no 106, al. 494 – Resolution on the Office for Euro-
pean Integration; Dziennik Urzedowy KIE Nr 1 (01)
from 27/03/2000. Uchwala KIE from 22.11.1996
on statute of the Committee for European Integra-
tion.
Policy, the Minister of Agriculture and Ru-
ral Development and the Minister of Justice.
The main statutory competences of the
Committee are the coordination of the proc-
ess of adjustment and integration of Poland
into the EU, adjustments in the sphere of
law, giving opinions on the conformity of
Polish legislation with EU law, the evalua-
tion of progress with regard to law ap-
proximation, coordination of foreign assis-
tance and cooperation with local govern-
ments in order to involve them in different
institutional structures of the EU. The
Committee is also responsible for strategy
planning, analysis of activities undertaken
and the provision of proper information
familiarising the whole society with the EU
accession process.90
The Committee presents to the Coun-
cil of Ministers programmes of adjustments
and integration strategies, drafts decisions
with regard to allocation of foreign assis-
tance, proposes legal acts and reports on
implementation of adjustment programmes
(NPPM – National Programme for Prepara-
tion of Membership). The Committee’s pro-
ceedings should be related to the National
Strategy of Integration with the EU (NIS) as
well as to the NPPM developed by the gov-
ernment of Poland, and to the Partnership
for Membership. This partnership, worked
out by the European Union, is a programme
of priority adjustment activities, which Po-
land should undertake in the pre-accession
period.
The Office of the Committee for Euro-
pean Integration is a specifically Polish
structure in terms of the number of staff
and the level of assigned competences, un-
like in other applicant countries.
3.3.3. The institutional set-up for accession
negotiations
Accession negotiations with six applicant
countries started in March 1998. Their ini-
tial stage – called screening – consisted of
two phases and of multilateral and bilateral
meetings (April 1998 – October 1999). The
                                                
90 Ibid.
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process of screening was in fact a review of
Polish legislation in view of its compatibility
with EC/EU law. Lists of European law in
particular spheres were transmitted to the
Head of the Negotiating Team. The Secre-
tary of the Negotiating Team transmitted
relevant packages to responsible members
of the team and to the head of the working
subcommittees. A copy of the list was sent to
all responsible ministries. In fact, it meant
in practice that civil servants in almost all
ministries were involved in the screening
process (EU integration departments and
units). It happened frequently that those
employees did not have sufficient expertise
in EU law, which led to delays at that
working stage.
Negotiations principally take place at
the level of ministers of foreign affairs and
their deputies in the framework of the bilat-
eral Intergovernmental Conferences inau-
gurated in March 1998.91 In particularly
difficult cases bilateral working groups (at
the level of heads of departments and units)
can be established, under the control of the
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
function of the secretariat of the Conference
is carried out by the team of civil servants of
the General Secretariat of the Council as
well as by Polish civil servants, under the
supervision of the General Secretary of the
Council or his substitute.
From 1998 until 2001, the political
leadership of the negotiations has been
given by the Prime Minister supported by
the Foreign Minister and the Government
Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Ne-
gotiations to the EU. The institution of the
Government Plenipotentiary was created by
the decision of the Council of Ministers on
the 24th of March 1998, before the negotia-
tion talks started. The term
“plenipotentiary” with regard to EU affairs
can be confusing, since between 1991 and
1997 there was a Plenipotentiary for Euro-
pean Integration, central figure of the
whole EU policy of that time.
                                                
91 On the course of negotiations refer to:
http://www.negocjacje.gov.pl , 15/11/2001.
The institutions that support the ac-
tivities of the Plenipotentiary are in par-
ticular the Department of Integration and
Negotiations with the EU in the Chancellery
of the Prime Minister, the Department of
European Integration in the MFA (including
the Department of the EU, the Department
of EU institutions and regional policy, the
Department of Economic Analysis and dip-
lomatic bodies); the Office of the Committee
for European Integration and in particular
the Department of Attendance to the Acces-
sion Negotiations, the Department of the
Integration Policy and the Department of
Law Harmonisation.
Jan Kułakowski was appointed as first
Government Plenipotentiary (Chief Nego-
tiator) and stayed in the role until October
2001. Kułakowski, an apolitical social-
scientist born in 1930, has lived in Belgium
since 1944 and studied at the University in
Leuven (PhD in law). Between 1954 and
1989 he worked in Trade Unions, and since
1976 was the General Secretary of the
World Labour Confederation. He started his
diplomatic career in 1990 appointed as an
Ambassador, Head of Poland’s Mission to
the EU (until 1996).92
His successor, Jan Truszczyński took
the office of Chief Negotiator on the 19th of
October 2001, following the change of gov-
ernment. Until November 2001, the Gov-
ernment Plenipotentiary was practically in
charge of accession negotiations, whereas
the Minister of Foreign Affairs was the Head
of the Polish delegation to the accession ne-
gotiations. The office of the Chief Negotiator
was originally established in the Chancel-
lery of the Prime Minister. Since the 20th of
October 2001 the Chief Negotiator is the
Under-Secretary of State in the MFA and
rapports directly to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs (and is not directly responsible to the
Prime Minister).93 His tasks include coordi-
nation of the process of accession negotia-
tions and, at the due opportunity, negotiat-
                                                
92 Cf. www.euro.pap.com.pl
93 Cf. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of
20/10/2001 on the appointment of a Government
Plenipotentiary for Accession Negotiations, Par. 2 al.
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ing the accession treaty. The Chief Negotia-
tor is supposed to elaborate a timetable for
negotiations, to take the initiative for the
drafting of legal acts and organisation proj-
ects related to the negotiation process, as
well as to coordinate preparations for the
accession treaty.94
3.3.4. The negotiation team for Poland’s
accession
Until October 2001, the Negotiation Team
comprised nineteen members, at the level of
secretaries and under-secretaries of state
from the major ministries, appointed to this
position by the Prime Minister. It consisted
of a Chairman (the Government Plenipo-
tentiary), a Secretary of the Negotiations
Team (Under-Secretary in the Office of the
Committee for European Integration,
Jaroslaw Pietras) and 17 members.95 Fol-
                                                
94 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of
20/10/2001 on the appointment of a Government
Plenipotentiary for Accession Negotiations, Par. 1 al.
1 and 2.
95 Members of the Negotiating Team (September
2001/November 2001). Source:
www.negocjacje.gov.pl 14/12/2001.
* Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Andrzej Ananicz)//Undersecretary of State in the
MFA and Chief Negotiator (Jan Truszczyński)
* Secretary of the Negotiating Team: Under-
Secretary in the Office of the Committee for Euro-
pean Integration, Jaroslaw Pietras//J. Pietras rep-
resenting the MFA
* Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime
Minister, Government Plenipotentiary for Family
Affairs (Maria Smereczyńska),//(----)
* Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice (Janusz
Niedziela)//(-----)
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labour
and Social Policy (Irena Boruta)// (Krystyna To-
karska-Biernacik)
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Trans-
port and Maritime Economy (Andrzej S. Grzela-
kowski)//Since October 2001 the Ministry of In-
frastructure (Krzysztof Heller)
* Deputy Chairman of the Office of Competition and
Consumer Protection (Elżbieta Modzelewska-
Wąchal)//(-----)
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance
(Krzysztof Ners)//(Andrzej Raczko)
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Rural Development (Jerzy Plewa)//no
change
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Envi-
ronment (Janusz Radziejowski)//(-----)
lowing the changes occurred in Autumn
2001, the number of members of the Nego-
tiating Team has been reduced to 11.96 Only
three members of the former team kept
their positions. However a couple of new-
comers have a recognised expertise in EU
affairs (e.g. the Undersecretary of State in
the Ministry of Economy). A reduction in
the number of members of the Negotiating
Team just to the representatives of most
strategic ministries means in practice an
increase of effectiveness of the team’s ac-
tivities, as well as a greater cohesion inside
the team. Consequently, it became easier to
take decisions in the cabinet.
The Chief Negotiator has several tasks:
he represents the Team and is the Chairman
of Team meetings. The meetings of the Ne-
gotiation Team take place twice a week,
with at least 10 members present, including
the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman (at
present Mr Andrzej Ananicz). The rules of
work of this team are defined in a decision
adopted by the Team on the 5th of May
1998, according to paragraph 10 of the
Prime Ministerial regulation number 19.
The Negotiation Team which previously was
                                                                         
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Health
(Andrzej Rys)//(-----)
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs and Administration (Piort Stachańc-
zyk)//(Zenon Kosiniak-Kamysz)
* Director of the Department of Regional Policy in
the Governmental Centre for Strategic Studies
(Marek Potrykowski)//(-----)
* Deputy Chairman in the Office of Regulation of
Telecommunications (Marek Rusin)//(-----)
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Econ-
omy (Teresa Małecka)//(Ewa Freyberg and Janusz
Kaczurba)
* Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Educa-
tion (Jerzy Zdrada)//(-----)
* Secretary of State in the Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development (Robert Grymek)//(----)
* Head of Poland’s Mission to the European Union
(Ivo Byczewski) // no change
96 Resolution no 129 of the President of the Council
of Ministers from 31/10/2001 on the Negotiating
Team for Accession Negotiations with the EU.
Apart the Chief Negotiator, the Head of the Polish
Mission to the EU and the Secretary of the Team,
representatives of eight key ministries are included:
finances, economy, infrastructure, agriculture, la-
bour, interior, foreign affairs, Committee for Euro-
pean Integration.
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situated in the Chancellery of the Prime
Minister, was shifted in October 2001 to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the new
Chief Negotiator Truszczynski, the role of
the Chief Negotiator97 has become more
technical and less autonomous and wide-
spread in the media.
The Negotiation Team prepares and
confirms projects of negotiation positions of
the Polish Government, and collaborates
intensively with line ministries, in charge of
particular chapters to be negotiated. All
members of the Negotiation Team are re-
quested to participate in meetings person-
ally – there is no legal possibility to sending
a representative.
3.3.5. Inter ministerial coordination – by
the Inter-Ministerial Team
The Inter-Ministerial Team for the Prepara-
tion of Accession Negotiations with the
European Union is an advisory body to the
Prime Minister, appointed under the Regu-
lation of 16 July 1998.98 The representatives
from individual ministries prepare and
present the documentation and proposals of
negotiation positions presented to the Nego-
tiating Team. Since the beginning of the
negotiation process, there are 37 sub-
groups within the Inter-Ministerial Team,
which give opinions on the negotiating po-
sitions.
The Inter-ministerial Team for
Preparation of Accession Negotiations is
supported by the Task Force Teams, which
are forums for consultation and confronta-
tion of the ministries’ interests and opinions
in the procedure of elaborating draft posi-
tion papers.
3.3.6. The Polish Mission to the EU
The complexity of the negotiation process
makes it absolutely essential that the CEECs
establish larger and more powerful missions
                                                
97 EuroPAP, 23 October 2001 www.euro.pap.com.pl
98 Regulation No 53 of the President of the Council of
Ministers on he Inter-Ministerial Team for the
Preparation of Accession Negotiations, 16/07/1998.
in Brussels for the duration of the negotia-
tions.99 The role of the Polish Mission to the
European Union is not as strong as the
Hungarian one (where the head of Mission
is at the same time the Chief Negotiator)
and mainly ensures technical assistance in
the negotiation process, carries out political
representation activities and provides in-
formation.
The Head of the Mission is a member
of the Negotiating Team. Ivo Byczewski,
Ambassador since February 2001, is the
former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
He replaced Jan Truszczynski, who had
been the Polish Ambassador to the EC for
over 4 years and who now has become the
Head of the Office for European Integration
and later EU Personal Adviser of the Presi-
dent in EU matters. In October 2001 he
replaced Jan Kułakowski, the Chief Nego-
tiator. The conclusion is simple: expert key-
posts remain in the hands of the same group
of people. The second key person, Minister
Plenipotentiary Maciej Popowski exercises
the functions of the Secretary of the Asso-
ciation Committee Poland-EU, the Secretary
of the Accession Conference Poland-EU and
is in charge of the EU institutional reform.
The structure of the Mission com-
prises nine departments, the political and
economic tasks are dealt with in the largest
departments while the social policy depart-
ment is the smallest one (only one em-
ployee).100 The members of the diplomatic
                                                
99 A. Mayhew (1998), ‘Preparation of EU and CEEC
Institutions for the Accession Negotiations’, in: ‘Pub-
lic Management Profiles of CEEC – Poland’,
CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA (98)39.
100 There are following members of the diplomatic
staff in Poland’s Mission to the EU (as on the 31st of
October 2001). Source: internal contact list of the
Polish Mission to the EU.
* Political department: Jarosław Starzyk, Zdzisław
Sosnicki, Wojciech Ostrowski, Piotr Wolczak,
Zbigniew Rzońca, Piort Adamiuk, Małgorzata Ko-
siura-Kazimierska
* Economic and trade department: Jacek Dominik,
Jan Lisiecki, Barbara Nieciak, Andrzej Skrzydło,
Piotr Swiętach, Iwona Idzikowska-Zyznowska,
Andrzej Bidziński
* Department of agriculture: Władysław Piskorz,
Danuta Kuczyńska-Cygal
* Social policy department: Janusz Gałęziak
29
staff are basically delegated from the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. However, some
members of the staff do not have a diplo-
matic background and are recruited from
line ministries e.g. agriculture or social af-
fairs.101
Since the need for expert staff in
Brussels is increasing the Polish Mission is
becoming increasingly important in terms
of number of staff. Some experts come to
Brussels thanks to concrete demands, e.g. an
expert civil servant on sanitary control is-
sues to deal with the BSE crisis.
As a general rule, members of the
diplomatic staff are performing their duties
for up to 4-5 years. Maciej Popowski who
used to be responsible for economic and
trade affairs and is today the Deputy Head
of Mission, has been working in the Mission
for the longest time: since 1993.
In December 2001, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs recalled Mr Byczewski, the
Head of Polish Mission to the EU, after only
ten months. The newly appointed Ambassa-
dor, Marek Grela has been a diplomat since
1972102 and is considered as a close associ-
ate of the President. The employment term
replacement of representatives in Brussels
means a strong politicisation of the posi-
tions. In fact, a few months after the change
of government, almost all key positions in
EU-related decision-making were ex-
changed.
3.3.7. The Polish Parliament
The Parliament is deeply involved in the
legislative process to approximate national
laws to EC/EU law. However, in terms of
impact of Poland’s EU-related policy, the
                                                                         
* Department of scientific research and environ-
mental protection: Bogdan Rokosz, Monika Solis
* Legal section: Marta Cygan
* Press section: Małgorzata Alterman
* Promotion section: Dariusz Sobków
* Information systems: Włodzimierz Marciński,
Iwona Starzyk
101 Interview with a senior civil servant, Poland’s
Mission to the EU, October 2001.
102 Rzeczpospolita, 16/01/2002.
lower chamber of Parliament (Sejm) has a
weak influence on EU-related decision-
making.
There are three parliamentary com-
mittees involved in the harmonization of
Polish law with EU standards: the European
Integration Committee, the Foreign Affairs
Committee and the ad hoc European Law
Committee. All these committees play an
important role in the legislative procedure,
but their political role is limited, e.g. no
Member of Parliament is represented in the
Negotiation Team. The ad hoc European
Law Committee was set up in 2000 in order
to speed up the process of adoption of EU
law.
In the upper chamber of the Parlia-
ment (Senat) there are two committees: the
Foreign Affairs and European Integration
Committee and the European Legislation
Committee. The Sejm continues to exercise
particularly intensive legislative activities in
the area of adjusting Polish law into Euro-
pean law. In addition, about 120 new laws
need to be passed in order to adjust the
current legal system to the Constitution
passed in 1997.103
Lack of information and errors of co-
ordination of EU oriented policy are explic-
itly pointed out in the declaration of the
Senate Foreign Affairs and European Inte-
gration Committee in its position on the role
of national parliaments in European archi-
tecture (July 2001). The text proposes the
creation of new organisational structures in
the Polish Parliament, which would enable
effective participation in EU-related deci-
sion-making. This may sound unusual, be-
cause it means creation of new structures
instead of increasing the effectiveness of the
existing ones.
The question of European Integration
seems to be a subject of interest not only to
the limited group of the Members of Par-
liament involved in the activities of the
above mentioned committees. Occasionally,
                                                
103 J. Hausner, R. Marody and others (2000), Jakosc
rządzenia – Polska blizej Unii Europejskiej, in: EU-
monitoring IV.
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parliamentary debates on European inte-
gration take place, in presence of the mem-
bers of government and the media. The
most vigorous debate took place in the Sejm
in February 2000, when the harmonisation
of Polish law with EU standards and the
public information strategy were the main
topics.
3.3.8. Key actors and their background104
Most of the key-actors have an economic or
political science background. Members of
the Negotiating Team are experts in the
field they are tackling, e.g. Jerzy Plewa, re-
sponsible for negotiations in the chapter
Agriculture, has a PhD in agriculture sci-
ences; Teresa Małecka, negotiator for free
movement of goods has a PhD in economics.
It is interesting to mention that Andrzej An-
anicz, responsible for the CFSP and Institu-
tions, is a graduate in Turkish philology,
was trained in Oxford and has taught in
Warsaw and Bloomington.
Three principal actors in the UKIE
have studied abroad. Jarosław Pietras has a
PhD in economics and is a former trainee of
the Fulbright Foundation, the University of
Glasgow as well as the Centre for European
Policy Studies in Brussels. He negotiated for
Poland the TRIPS agreement (1991-1994)
as well as the Europe Agreement. Jacek
Saryusz Wolski has a PhD in economics and
has finished postgraduate studies in the
Centre Européen Universitaire in Nancy,
and undertaken traineeships in Paris, Lyon,
Grenoble and Oxford. Paweł Samecki has a
PhD in economics (specialisation interna-
tional economic relations), was trained in
Cairo and LSE London. After graduation he
followed a brilliant civil service carrier as
Director of the Department of Foreign As-
sistance in the UKIE and Under Secretary of
State in the Ministry of Finances and the
UKIE.
The Chief Negotiator Jan Truszczyński
an economics and European studies gradu-
                                                
104 Source: website of the Polish government
www.kprm.gov.pl 15/09/2001 and 7/01/2002
and www.euro.pap.com.pl
ate, has accomplished postgraduate studies
in German and international public law.
Since 1972 he has been working at the
Ministry of Foreign affairs in charge of
European Integration. Prof. Danuta Hübner,
Secretary of State in the MFA, responsible
for the UKIE and European integration is an
external commerce graduate Her scientific
periods abroad include Geneva, Sussex,
Madrid and Berkeley.
Some of the key-actors, particularly
those linked to the Miller government had
close ties with the communist regime. The
Prime Minister Miller himself (political sci-
entist, former Secretary of PZPR, Polish
Unified Workers Party – communists), and
the Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz (PhD in
law, Member of Parliament since 1989
from the communist party) are the most
important examples.
The international background of Pol-
ish key-actors in the enlargement process
means in practice more self-confidence and
openness to negotiate on an equal level with
EU counterparts and pursuing a negotiation
strategy that is not weaker than the Com-
mission’s strategy. Basically all key actors
since the beginning of the transformation
process are strongly in favour of accession
to the EU, as the only guarantee for Poland’s
strong international position and the suc-
cess of transformation. A weakness of politi-
cal forces opposed to EU integration can be
attributed to the fact that their key politi-
cians have a poor knowledge of EU policies
and poor linguistic skills.
3.4. Accession negotiations on employ-
ment, social policy and administra-
tive capacity: A case study
The negotiation chapter “Employment and
social policy” encompasses legal provisions
related to specific issues such as labour law,
social dialogue, equal treatment of women
and men, fight against racism and xeno-
phobia, employment as well as public
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health.105 In view of the number of issues to
be considered, it is one of the most complex
negotiation chapters, which the EU and Po-
land closed successfully on the 1st of June
2001.
First sessions of multilateral screening
took place in October 1998 with the par-
ticipation of representatives of all countries
from the so-called “Luxembourg group”. At
this stage, experts of the European Com-
mission presented the acquis com-
munautaire in this field and answered the
questions of experts from candidate coun-
tries. The bilateral screening took place in
Autumn 1998 and was led on the Polish
side by the Undersecretary of State in the
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (mem-
ber of the Negotiating Team). Before the
beginning of the bilateral screening the
Commission sent so called screening lists A
and B containing legal acts (primary and
secondary law), as a sort of guidelines in
reviewing Polish legislation to be harmo-
nised with EC/EU law.
The negotiation position on this
chapter of the acquis was prepared by an
inter-ministerial working group, which
consisted of civil servants from several
ministries: Ministry of Labour and Social
Policy, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of
Finances, etc. During the process of drafting
a negotiating position numerous consulta-
tions with social partners, interests groups
and, above all, with representatives of small
and medium-sized enterprises took place.106
The working group submitted its position to
the Negotiation Delegation, and when
adopted by the Negotiation Team, it was
discussed in the inter-ministerial Committee
for European Integration. The negotiation
position was finally adopted by the Council
of Ministers in May 1999. The Government
Plenipotentiary for Accession Negotiations
                                                
105 See: negotiation position in the area of ‘Employ-
ment and Social Policy’ adopted by the Council of
Ministers on the 25th of May 1999.
106 Pełnomocnik Rządu do Spraw Negocjacji o
Członkostwo RP w Unii Euroepjskiej (2001),
‘Zrozumieć negocjacje’, Chapter: ‘Polityka społeczna
i zatrudnienie’, Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów,
Warsaw, 2001, p. 105.
presented the position on employment and
social policy to the Sejm Commission for
European Integration. Thus, as to negotia-
tion positions, the deputies in the Parlia-
ment are consulted and can articulate their
opinions but they do not participate in the
process of formulating and deciding posi-
tions.107
Basically the position on employment
and social policy followed the general prin-
ciple of full adoption of the acquis com-
munautaire upon accession, with only two
derogations. Requests for transitional peri-
ods concerned requirements of security and
hygiene of using equipment in the work
place and minimum requirements for appli-
cation of individual protection of workers.
These were justified by prohibitive costs of
immediate implementation of EU rules for
small and medium enterprises. However, it
took two years to close the chapter. The
Commission’s “common position” was ne-
gotiated between the two partners. Modifi-
cations of the negotiating position were ac-
companied by technical consultations be-
tween Polish civil servants and experts from
the European Commission.
The change of the negotiation position
at the beginning of 2001, which consisted
of the renouncing of a transitional period
(on individual protection of workers and on
protection of workers against biological risk
factors108) needed prior approval of the
Cabinet of Ministers. It was based on de-
tailed analysis and evaluation of potential
costs of implementation of directives in the
mentioned areas. Due to the modified na-
tional position on the Polish side, it was
possible to close temporarily the accession
negotiations in the field of employment and
social policy. The closure of the chapter
took place on the 1st of June 2001 during a
                                                
107 M. Brusis, J. A. Emmanouilidis (2000), ‘Negotiat-
ing EU Accession: Policy Approaches of Advanced
Candidate Countries from Central and Eastern
Europe’, p. 16.
108 Pełnomocnik Rządu do Spraw Negocjacji o
Członkostwo RP w Unii Euroepjskiej (2001),
‘Zrozumieć negocjacje’, Chapter: ‘Polityka społeczna
i zatrudnienie’, Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów,
Warsaw, 2001, p. 107.
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negotiation session at the level of deputy
heads of delegations.
3.5. Interactions with Brussels
3.5.1. Levels of interactions resulting from
the Association Agreement
Specific interactions between the European
Commission and administrations in appli-
cant countries go beyond traditional diplo-
matic relations, where only high-ranking
officials meet. The contacts between the
Polish administration and EU institutions
take place at two levels, the political and the
working level. At the political level, meet-
ings are related to the implementation of the
Europe Agreement and take place in the
framework of the following institutions: the
Association Council, the Association Com-
mittee and its Subcommittees as well as the
Parliamentary Association Committee. Pol-
ish actors involved in the Association Com-
mittee meetings are at least directors of de-
partments.
At the working level, it is much more
interesting to observe the involvement of
civil servants on both sides and the scope of
co-operation. Usually, members of
COREPER meet representatives of ministerial
working groups at the level of deputy di-
rectors. Both representatives of the EC Dele-
gation in Poland and the European Com-
mission in Brussels stress the efficient
working contacts at medium level (desk
officers, deputy directors). Technical day-
by-day co-operation is focused on pro-
grammes (PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD) as well as
Community programmes in which Poland
participates. Departments of European Inte-
gration in line ministries, expert depart-
ments specialised in a concrete matter, as
well as implementing agencies are the main
interlocutors of Commission civil ser-
vants.109 Polish civil servants at medium
                                                
109 Interview with a senior official, EC Delegation in
Warsaw, October 2001.
level – experts, senior experts and heads of
unit – are involved in the process.
The EC Delegation in Warsaw has
been dealing almost exclusively with the
UKIE, which has been the first partner for
working discussion. At the second level,
there are governmental or non-
governmental implementing agencies re-
sponsible for the management of several
Community programmes in Poland. Finally,
contacts take place at the level of particular
ministries. Since management of Commu-
nity assistance has been decentralised, com-
petences with regard to the coordination of
PHARE and other programmes have been
transferred to Warsaw. In this respect, lev-
els of cooperation include programming of
PHARE and meetings of PHARE monitoring
committees (twice a year).
Apart from relations between the Task
Force Poland and the UKIE, other Commis-
sion offices and Directorates General are
also involved in the process, for example
EUROSTAT maintains contacts with the Pol-
ish Office for Statistics, DG Enterprise with
the Ministry of Economy, DG INFSOC (for
telecom) with the Office for Regulation of
Telecommunications. In case when contacts
take place between line ministries and the
Commission, the UKIE is always informed.
3.5.2. Interactions in view of accession ne-
gotiations
Since the beginning of negotiation talks,
links between Polish administration and the
Commission are of course getting closer.
The Prime Minister and the Minister of For-
eign Affairs (the head of the Negotiating
Team) participate in the talks at the political
level with Commissioner Verheugen and
other Members of the Commission. At the
more technical level, the EU Chief Negotia-
tor meets regularly (once a week) the Polish
Chief Negotiator.
The European Commission plays the
role of an intermediary between the candi-
dates and EU members. Therefore, diplo-
matic activities and lobbying which Poland
is conducting in Brussels as well as in other
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EU capitals are extremely important.110 Ac-
cording to civil servants working in the
European Commission, the Missions to the
EU play a very important role in bringing
administrations in the applicant countries
nearer to the Brussels’ centre. For the Task
Force Poland (DG Enlargement), the Polish
Mission to the EU is a very useful source of
information and contacts in Poland. That is
why there are very close links between the
Mission and the Team Poland. The relations
between Missions and TAIEX are excellent
on a formal and semi-formal level, since
this cooperation is in the interest of both
parties.111
In fact, accession negotiations require
interactions at many levels: the European
Commission, EU member states, but mostly
partners in Poland. Broad consultations
with professional organisations and interest
groups as well a successful information
policy about the negotiations facilitate
reaching an internal compromise, as a
starting point before the proper negotiations
start.
Applicant countries, and in particular
the so-called Luxemburg group, cooperate
closely in the field of accession negotiations.
There are informal meetings at the level of
Chief Negotiators, and meetings on lower
levels. Expert cooperation, which is com-
plementary to the political cooperation, also
takes place; it enables the elaboration of
common positions of the applicant countries
as well as a platform of mutual information
exchange on the conduct of negotiations.112
                                                
110 Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic
of Poland, Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s
Accession Negotiations to the European Union
(2000), ‘Accession Negotiations. Poland on the Road
to the EU’, Warsaw, October 2000, p. 33.
111 Interview with an expert of the European Com-
mission, October 2001.
112 Cf. Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Negotia-
tions on Poland’s membership in the EU 1998-2000,
http://www.kprm.gov.pl/ue/PRZYPIS1.htm
4. THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS
IN THE ACCESSION PROCESS
4.1. Current perception of civil service
in Poland: Objectives and problems
of civil service reform
Due to a close political correlation with ad-
ministrators under the communist regime,
the image of employees working in public
administration is very negative. In fact, a
term of “civil servant” does not exist in the
social consciousness: the notion of
“urzędnik”, related to a public administra-
tion employee has very negative connota-
tions with the past, and implies phenomena
such as corruption, incompetence and lack
of motivation. According to opinion polls on
professional honesty and integrity, one of
the lowest results was gained by state pubic
servants (9 per cent).113 Only politicians
and Members of Parliament obtained a
lower score (6 per cent).114 This data per-
fectly mirrors the nation-wide pessimism
vis-à-vis public officials. For that reason, the
first objective of civil service reform is to
regulate the situation of civil servants and to
restore their legitimacy in the society. The
major challenge for the Polish Civil Service
goes beyond the implementation of civil
service law and tries to work out how to
give legitimacy to the public administration
in the eyes of citizens and taxpayers in or-
der to build up confidence in the admini-
stration. At the same time a public informa-
tion campaign on the functioning of the
civil service has been launched in 2000 to
                                                
113 CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre) June-July
2000, ‘Opinion on Professional Honesty and Integ-
rity’.
114 Whereas university teachers (62 per cent) and
nurses (57 per cent) were most positively assessed.
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improve the image of public administration
in the society.115
Other important objectives of civil
service reform include the establishment of
mechanisms of control and accountability
in order to prevent abuse of public powers
and mismanagement of public resources,116
and separation as far as possible of the pub-
lic domain of politics from the public do-
main of administration.
The main problem of Polish civil
service is to attract the best-motivated can-
didates, to retain them by offering reason-
able career development prospects, personal
self-fulfilment and to introduce structures
which will promote social confidence in the
service. The reforms should have the fol-
lowing objectives: “an open, flexible, equi-
table and structured civil service frame-
work, with more flexible entry and exit
mechanisms to take in talent and remove
non-performers at all levels; an enabling
and motivating environment for civil ser-
vants with a competitive but performance-
based reward system to attract, retain and
motivate civil servants, a practice based on
the principles of accountable and responsi-
ble behaviour, enhancing efficiency and
quality of service”.117 The reform intro-
duced in Poland in 1999 tries to realise
these objectives and politicians are con-
scious that the process will be long lasting.
As to the separation of politics from ad-
ministration, important steps were taken in
2001, through restructuring the centres of
power and the limitation of direct influence
of the Prime Minister as well as reduction of
the number of political advisers.
                                                
115 Report on the realisation of the National Pro-
gramme of Preparation for Membership in the EU
(NPPM), adopted by the Committee for European
Integration on 22.02.2002, p. 434.
116 Targets of the civil service reform quoted in:
SIGMA Papers (1999), No. 27, ‘European Principles
for Public Administration’, CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA
(99)44/REV1, p. 22.
117 A. B. L. Cheung, quoted in: B. Kudrycka (2001),
‘The Changing Position and Status of Civil Servants’,
rapporteur at the 25th International Congress of
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Governance and Public Administration in the 21st
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4.2. Civil servants involved in EU-
related decision-making
There is a very limited civil service class in
Poland, which remains active independent
of the political situation. As concerns high-
ranking actors, the same people remained
on the highest posts since 1989. A conclu-
sion that can be drawn from CVs of appli-
cations addressed to TAIEX shows that many
officials had been working for communist
governments, having been civil servants for
20 years. A similarity of attitudes of civil
servants in applicant countries is strongly
perceived.
According to Jabloński, in the early
90s, the structure of Polish central govern-
ment and administration were conceived as
a source of serious shortcomings of political
and economic management in Poland; he
stresses that a lack of cooperation and coor-
dination of the policies of the semi-
independent ministries and incoherent and
often contradictory decisions adopted by
particular ministries created decision-
making chaos.118
One of the most important character-
istics of the accession-related human re-
sources structures in Poland is an important
rotation of civil servants, a frequent
changing of posts in several ministries.119
This phenomenon is particularly visible
with regard to key actors, performing duties
in the EU integration field, independently of
their political affiliation. The former Secre-
tary of State for European Integration
Saryusz-Wolski (1998-2001) is not a mem-
ber of a party (even if he has centre-right
tendencies). The Polish first Chief Negotia-
tor Kułakowski (1998-2001) was replaced
in this post by Truszczyński, former Am-
bassador to the EU and Adviser to the Presi-
                                                
118 A.W. Jabłonski (1997), ‘Europeanisation of Public
Administration in Central Europe. Poland in Com-
parative Perspective’, Final Report, NATO Research
Fellowship Report 1997, p. 28.
119 Interview with a senior official of the European
Commission, October 2001.
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dent, politically more left orientated. This
phenomenon leads in Poland to the stable
existence of only a very small expert elite
group in European affairs.
4.3. Reform of the civil service and its
influence on the whole administra-
tive capacity
In a report of the Commission’s expert
group,120 a lack of trained administrative
personnel for the public service in Central
Europe and a problem of “brain-drain”
from the public to private sectors have been
identified. Both these problems exist in Po-
land, since there is no incentive for young,
well-educated people to join the civil serv-
ice. This situation – in which motivation to
work is low and corruption is demonstrative
– has slowly started to change after the en-
try info force of the Civil Service Act on the
1st of July 1999.
In its document entitled “Partnership
for Membership” (1997), the European
Commission stressed the necessity to im-
prove the competence and knowledge of
European integration issues of civil servants.
The NPPM, a key-document on the Polish
side stresses the access to civil service and
preparation of regional administration for
participating in EU policies, programmes
and Community funds as priority areas on
the way to membership. In practice, the
enforcement of the civil service reform
takes place along two paths:
* Through the PHARE – Twinning Pro-
gramme launched on the 9th of September
2000 and aimed at the improvement of
effectiveness of management in public
administration and access to civil service
in Poland.
* On the basis of the agreement between the
Head of the Civil Service and the EIPA
                                                
120 European Commission (2001), ‘White Paper on
Governance’, Report of Group 6, ‘Policies for an
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Maastricht – 12 April 2000.121 Participa-
tion in activities of this Institute implies a
comparative approach to different ad-
ministration systems in the member states,
as well as organisation of training and
research sojourns of Polish civil servants
in the EIPA.
According to a SIGMA report from
2000, around 16 000 people are employed
in central ministerial and non-ministerial
institutions.122 Only 500 out of 16 000
were nominated civil servants, e.g. have
passed preparatory service and examination
and were successful in the qualification
procedure, according to the 1999 Civil
Service Law. According to the Civil Service
Office Report of Activities 2000, there were
1387 higher-ranking civil servants out of
16 000 civil servants employed in central
ministerial and non-ministerial institutions,
engaged under the Civil Service Law.123 An
annual limit of nominations has been fixed
at 500 per year.124 In practice, the number
of appointed civil servants per year is much
lower, e.g. in 2001 267 civil servants were
appointed, including 58 graduates from the
National School of Public Administration.125
The most important source of well
qualified civil servants is the National
School of Public Administration (KSAP) es-
tablished in May 1990. This school was set
up in order to help Poland face new politi-
cal, social and administrative challenges
and is a postgraduate establishment for law,
economics and administration school
graduates. About 50 students graduate
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yearly and start to work in the public ad-
ministration, (entering the school has a
prerequisite that graduates will work for at
least 5 years in public administration). They
automatically get the status of civil servant.
4.4. The civil service reform
According to a SIGMA document, there are
several issues which must be taken into
consideration in the administrative capacity
assessment.126 On the basis of SIGMA crite-
ria, civil service reform must respond to
several requirements in order to be suc-
cessful:127
* Legal status of civil servants
* Legality, responsibility and accountability
of public servants
* Impartiality and integrity of public service
* Efficiency in the management of public
servants and in control of staffing
* Professionalism and stability of public
servants
* Development of civil service capacities in
the area of European integration.
Poland has certainly fulfilled the first
prerequisite, by introducing a civil service
law. Progress is also made as to the devel-
opment of EU competences of the civil ser-
vants. However, the remaining factors are
linked to a need for mentality change and
progress will probably require a much
longer time.
The relatively positive assessment of
civil service reform was compromised in
December 2001, when the Polish parlia-
ment introduced an amendment to this law,
                                                
126 SIGMA (1999), ‘European Principles for Public
Administration’, SIGMA PAPERS No. 27;
CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA(99)44/REV1, p. 8.
127 Cf. Baseline issues for horizontal administrative
capacity reform quoted in: T. Verheijen (2000),
‘Administrative Capacity Development. A Race
against Time?’, Scientific Council for Government
Policy WRR; Working Documents W 107/2000, p.
18.
enabling the general directors in line min-
istries in the period before 2005, to hire
candidates – initially not belonging to the
top civil service – for high-ranking posts.
Such an appointment will depend on the
consent of the Prime Minister, if the candi-
date possesses a particular experience or
professional capacities.128 The amendment
waters down reforms, which have been
successfully introduced and will probably
lead to a new politicisation of high-ranking
positions in Polish administration, and the
promotion of administrators coming from
the old regime. It can be expected that the
European Commission will severely react to
this development.
4.5. The coordination of EU-related de-
cision-making
Coordination of EU-related decision-
making in Poland operates in an institu-
tional triangle, involving the Prime Minister
(and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister),
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the
Committee for European Integration (sup-
ported by the Office of the Committee for
European Integration – UKIE). As stated in
the previous chapter, the Miller government
reduced the role of UKIE.
It is extremely interesting to investi-
gate the linkage between the three institu-
tions and a redefined role of the Committee
for European Integration, which is headed
by the Prime Minister. The Secretary of the
Committee for European Integration (Da-
nuta Hübner) is at the same time Secretary
of State in the MFA. This means in fact a
strengthening of the political role of the KIE.
The European Commission seems to appre-
ciate very much this institution, which, ac-
cording to a Commission official, ensures
the best coordination of Polish EU integra-
tion policy. The Polish MFA, the Prime Min-
ister and the UKIE always present a unified
view vis-à-vis EU matters and there are
never contradictory positions between
them.
                                                
128 Polish Press Agency, 18/12/2001.
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4.6. Problems of cooperation between
ministries
One of the major weaknesses of the internal
coordination concerns intra- and inter-
ministerial cooperation at the level of civil
servants. Due probably to a post-communist
heritage, a cooperative model of civil serv-
ice is rather unknown. Civil servants are
very concerned with keeping a hierarchical
relationship with their colleagues and tend
to compete between themselves rather than
share information or know-how. Training
in the framework of Twinning constitutes a
very important example. After being
trained, civil servants go back to their min-
istries and are not likely to spread their
newly gathered knowledge, but keep it for
themselves.129 This also illustrates another
problem: a general lack of communication
between civil servants within a ministry,
and also on an inter-ministerial level.
In spite of the introduction of admin-
istrative reforms, there is still a great con-
centration of power and administrative
competence in the centre of the executive
authority.130
One of the most important features of
the Polish civil service reform is the impor-
tance accorded to the highest officials. Al-
ready in 1995 a SIGMA paper stressed131
that Poland is following the Dutch model by
developing a Senior Public Service with a
strong emphasis on the professional devel-
opment of managers and on improving co-
ordination capacities. The policy preserving
management mechanisms for highest offi-
cials in the government led to a situation in
which Poland has a very strong core of civil
servants at the highest level, implying a gap
between them and the medium level offi-
                                                
129 Interview with a senior official of the European
Commission, TAIEX office, October 2001.
130 J. Pastwa (2000), ‘The Role of the Centre of Gov-
ernment. Reforms in Years 1996-2000’; OECD
seminar “Government Coherence”, 6-7 October
2000, Budapest, p. 7.
131 SIGMA Papers (1995), No 1, ‘Top Management
Service in Central Government: Introducing a System
for the Higher Civil Service in Central and Eastern
European Countries’, OECD, Paris, 1995.
cials who are not necessarily incompetent,
but are not directly involved in the EU-
related decision-making.
5. CONCLUSIONS: POLISH PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION – FIT FOR
MEMBERSHIP?
After more than a decade since the trans-
formation process started, Poland is on a
good way towards the creation of an effi-
cient public administration system. This is
of particular importance, because insuffi-
cient administrative capacities in new
member states could impede the progress of
further integration. Poland has already built
up strong and democratic institutions and
successfully developed administrative
structures. The country has at its disposal an
efficient core of civil service well trained in
EU affairs, which is responsible for initiat-
ing, leading and implementing EU-related
policies. Over the last few years, the coordi-
nation between ministerial bodies as well as
contacts with EU institutions has definitely
improved. The country fulfils the political
criteria set up in Copenhagen and, at the
same time, it continues the efforts to fully
respond to the administrative prerequisites
for accession.
However, the setting up of institutions
and passing of laws will not be enough to
integrate Polish administration into the
European administrative space. In particu-
lar questions of political culture, mentality
and ethics of work, which the current Polish
administration has inherited from its com-
munist past, are factors which need a whole
generation to be changed. For the near fu-
ture, there are three main weaknesses that
the Polish administration will have to over-
come.
First of all, the Polish administration
needs to become more effective in the im-
plementation of the acquis. An effective
implementation of the administrative re-
form as well as reliable enforcement of EU
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conform legislation should be absolute pri-
orities on the eve of EU accession. As Elmar
Brok, MEP, pointed out, “it is not enough to
show good will by passing the necessary
laws and by creating the necessary institu-
tions. There must also be the ability to put
these laws into operation (…).The institu-
tions must function in order to manage
membership”.132
Secondly, the widespread corruption
by which high-ranking civil servants and
politicians are affected, leads to a highly
critical attitude of the Polish society. Ac-
cording to the evaluation made by Trans-
parency International in 2001, Poland re-
mains the country where the level of cor-
ruption is one of the highest in central
Europe.133 The methods to fight this phe-
nomenon include improving the effective-
ness of the judicial system and strengthen-
ing the involvement of the police and the
border guard service in the anti-corruption
fight.
Thirdly, there is no debate on govern-
ance and division of competences between
national, regional and local levels. As yet,
EU-related decision-making is made at the
national level and does not involve regional
bodies. The situation, in which the problems
of multi-level governance are not addressed
adequately, should change. The debate on
the strengthening of the institutions and a
new division of powers at the European,
national and regional levels constitutes a
fundamental item on the European agenda.
However, Poland, similarly to most appli-
cant countries, has not yet taken up the EU
debate on governance, which is far away
from its immediate concerns as an applicant
country.
In the last decade, Poland has basically
prioritised EU-related policies on a political
level. At present, the role of key-actors –
politicians – is clearly predominant over the
EU involvement of administrators at the
                                                
132 E. Brok (2000), ‘The EU after Enlargement: Man-
aging Coexistence of Newcomers and Veterans in a
United Europe’, Public Management Forum, Vol. VI –
N° 1 – 2000, p. 6.
133 The Economist, 1 December 2001.
technical, and apolitical level. Improving
the latter has to be a priority. In the coming
months directly preceding the moment of
accession, the gap between strengthening of
EU capacities at the national level of the
ministries and decentralisation (compe-
tences attributed to civil servants, officials
having to implement EU-related tasks at
their respective levels) has to be filled.
To sum up, so far the process of Euro-
peanisation of Polish public administration
has being successful, and major steps for-
ward have clearly been made. The Polish
administration is deeply affected by the pro-
cess of Europeanisation, according to the
definition given by Wessels and
Rometsch.134 EU-related decision-making
has become a priority area over the last
twelve years, involving all core institutions
and even larger circles of actors (politicians
and civil servants). However, a positive
prognosis and the progress already made
does not mean that the process has been
fully accomplished.
                                                
134 Europeanisation is a ‘shift of attention of all na-
tional institutions and their increasing participation
– in terms of the number of actors and the intensity –
in the EC/EU decision-making cycle’ – Wessels and
Rometsch quoted in: B. Lippert, G. Umbach, W.
Wessels (2001), ‘Europeanisation of CEE Executives:
EU Membership Negotiations as a Shaping Power’,
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. VIII, No. VI,
p. 980.
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GRAPH 1
Model of central co-ordination with a strong Prime Minister
as of March 2001
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GRAPH 2
Influence of the political changes occurred in November 2001
on the central co-ordination of EU-related decision-making
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GRAPH 3
The simplified structure of coordination of EU-related decision-making
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This paper outlines the institutional adapta-
tion process of Hungary to EU requirements
– from the systemic change until September
2002 – by concentrating on the government
level decision-making structures and insti-
tutional relations to the EU (with special
emphasis on the last government led by
Viktor Orbán and the present one led by
Péter Medgyessy). The aim of this paper is
to give an overview of the evolution of the
Hungarian political system and to try to
make some assessment of efficiency and EU
readiness of Hungary by taking a closer look
at the in terms of public administration and
its capacity to adopt and apply the acquis.
This is a relevant issue not only on the eve
of accession but also from the perspective of
making full membership sustainable after
accession. The paper is based on the as-
sumption that there exists no clear-cut ad-
ministrative model within EU member states
that would be worth “copying” for candi-
date countries. Therefore the conclusion can
be drawn that the present system (even if
marked by some weaknesses) would seem to
enable Hungary to comply timely and effi-
ciently with EU requirements.
In the first part of the paper these re-
flections are put in a broader context; spe-
cial attention is given to the establishment
of Hungary’s constitutional and political
system, the major characteristics of the
Hungarian public administration and other
‘background variables’ which might greatly
influence the development and “European-
isation” of the Hungarian public admini-
stration. The paper then continues with the
analysis of the Hungarian EU-related deci-
sion-making system and describes the
structures and the key actors within it. As-
sessment of the performance of the Hun-
garian public administration from the point
of view of EU readiness is given at the end
of the chapters as well as in the concluding
chapter.
1) HISTORY AND POLITICAL
PRIORITIES OF HUNGARY’S EU
ACCESSION PROCESS
As early as in the 1970s Hungary signed
some specific trade agreements with the
then EEC and in 1988 concluded the Trade
and Cooperation Agreement, which meant a
qualitative leap in the bilateral relations
between Hungary and the European Com-
munity. After the systemic change in
1989/1990, Hungary – just like the other
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post-socialist countries – turned to the
Euro-Atlantic institutions with the aim of
gaining full membership. This has been all
the more important as Eastern European
„integration” institutions (COMECON and
Warsaw Pact) ceased to exist by the end of
1991. The new democracies started to look
for new anchors in political, security and
economic terms.
Becoming a full member of the Euro-
pean Union has been a top priority of Hun-
garian foreign policy practically since
1990, regardless of the composition of the
government. The regular opinion polls
show that the majority of Hungarian citi-
zens support (and has always supported)
this goal. According to latest polls1 2/3 of
the Hungarian population would vote yes in
a referendum about membership, and only
9 per cent would be against. With those
data Hungary is among the most pro EU
membership candidate states. This is all the
more important that in all likelyhood Hun-
gary will organise a decisive referendum
(not a consultative one) next year, after the
Accession Treaty shall be signed.
Hungary signed the Association
(„Europe”) Agreement with the EC in De-
cember 1991 as the first country from the
region together with Poland. Thus, Hungary
enjoys associated status with the EU since
1994, while the Interim Agreement on trade
liberalisation already came into force in
1992.2 On the 31st of March 1994, Hun-
gary submitted its application for full mem-
bership in the EU to which the European
                                                
1 Conducted in 2002 by the GfK Hungária Research
Institute. For a detailed, comparative analysis see:
European Commission (2001), ‘Applicant Countries
Eurobarometer 2001’.
http://www.europa.eu.in/comm/public_opinion/cc
eb/aceb20011_summary.pdf
2 Rácz, Margit (1995), ‘Economic Aspects of Hun-
garian-EC Association: Improvements in Trade but
Little Assistance to Transformation’, in: Lippert, Bar-
bara – Schneider, Heinrich (eds.), ‘Monitoring Asso-
ciation and beyond The European Union and the
Visegrád States’, Bonn, pp. 177-185; Inotai, András
(1995), ‘Economic Impact of the Association Agree-
ment: The Case of Hungary’, in: Lippert, Barbara –
Schneider, Heinrich (eds.), ‘Monitoring Association
and Beyond The European Union and the Visegrád
States’, Bonn, pp. 295-325.
Commission replied with the sending out of
a questionnaire3 in April 1996. Based on
the answers, the Commission elaborated its
opinion concerning Hungary (and all other
applicant countries) and proposed to the
Luxembourg European Council (December
1997) to start negotiations with Budapest,
among others.4 Thus, the negotiations were
opened the 31st of March 1998 and the ac-
quis screening process started at the end of
April, while in parallel the negotiations on
the terms of accession were launched in
November 1998. According to the official
plans and timetables, these negotiations
could be finished by the end of 2002.5
All this demonstrates that since 1992
Hungary has established institutional rela-
tions with the EU via the Association insti-
tutions (joint Association Council, Associa-
tion Committee, Association Parliamentary
Committee) and seems to be on an irre-
versible path towards gaining full mem-
bership in 2004.
The Copenhagen European Council in
June 1993 gave green light to the possibility
of Eastern enlargement and concluded that
a European country wishing to accede to the
EU must fulfil the following criteria: It must
have stable democratic institutions, must
respect human and minority rights, must
have a functioning market economy (able to
withstand internal market competition),
and must have reached a satisfactory degree
of legal harmonisation. The Madrid Euro-
pean Council in December 1995 added a
last criterion: the ability of applying the
acquis via institution-building, indispensa-
ble for a would-be full EU member state
(institutional readiness).
In this paper the compliance of Hun-
gary with the first and third Copenhagen
criteria, specifically the management of EU
                                                
3 European Commission (1996), ‘Questionnaire
Hungary: Information Requested for the Preparation
of the Opinion on the Application for Membership of
the European Union’, Brussels.
4 European Commission (1997), ‘Opinion on Hun-
gary’s Application for Membership of the European
Union’, Brussels (DOC/97/13).
5 As endorsed by the European Council in Gothen-
burg and Laeken during 2001.
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affairs by the Hungarian central admini-
stration will be described and analysed. This
is crucial due to the fact that the EU is a
legal Community where the public admini-
strations of member states take an active
part in the implementation of EU decisions
and may also be involved in the preparatory
phase of decision-making. Thus, looking at
the performance of the Hungarian public
administration is important from both as-
pects: for the analysis of compliance with
the accession criteria before, and the readi-
ness of taking an active and efficient part in
the decision-making and smooth imple-
mentation of the acquis after entering the
EU. The latter aspect will be highlighted by
hinting to the Program of Functioning as a
member state adopted by the government in
September this year.
2) STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF THE
HUNGARIAN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
2.1. The Hungarian political system and
state administration – Strengthened
stability
The Constitution of Hungary prescribes the
separation of powers in the country’s demo-
cratic system and lays down basic rules of
government and public administration.
Hungary has still no newly created Consti-
tution: the present one is based on the Con-
stitution of 1949 (XX/1949), as substan-
tially modified by Act XXXI/1989 and sev-
eral times thereafter. There is an ongoing
revision process which could result in a
new Constitution. This process is acceler-
ated this autumn as Hungary’s full mem-
bership of the EU nears, since EU member-
ship will itself impact on the Constitution of
Hungary given the partial transfer of sover-
eignty of the Hungarian state to the EU.6
The Hungarian Republic is a parlia-
mentary democracy with a strong Prime
Minister and a rather weak position of the
President.7 Both the Prime Minister and the
President are elected by the Parliament. The
Parliament is composed of one chamber
with a mixed electoral system, which means
that candidates can become MPs either by
winning in a constituency or through party
lists. The major task of the Parliament is of
course adopting laws which might be pro-
posed by the President (very rare), by the
government, by any parliamentary com-
mittee or any individual member of the Par-
liament.
Concerning the potential reform of
the legislature there are two aspects debated
recurrently. The question is on the one
hand, if the disproportionately high number
of MPs (386 for a country of 10 million
inhabitants) should be cut back? On the
other hand, should a second chamber be
created? Who would sit in such an “upper
chamber” or “senate”? The national mi-
norities (Roma, Slovaks, Rumanians, Ger-
mans, etc.), the social partners, the regions?
Such changes too would require amend-
ments of the Constitution.
After the third free elections (held in
1990, 1994 and 1998) the position of the
Prime Minister has been strengthened by
Viktor Orbán whose party was the main
part of a centre-right coalition composed of
FIDESZ-MPP (Alliance of Young Democrats-
Hungarian Peoples Party), FKGP (Independ-
ent Smallholders’ Party) and of MDF (Hun-
                                                
6 Vastagh, Pál (2002), ‘A magyar alkotmányfejlődés
jellemző vonásai, különös tekinettel az európai uniós
integrációra’ (Features of the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Development with Special Regard to European
Integration), Európa 2002, II/4.
7 For description of the Hungarian political system
see among others: Ágh, Attila – Kurtán, Sándor (eds.)
(1995), ‘Democratization and Europeanization in
Hungary: the First Parliament (1990-1994)’, Hun-
garian Centre for Democracy Studies, Budapest; Ágh,
Attila (1994), ‘Hungary: The Politics of Transition’,
Cass, London; Schmidt, Mária – Tóth Gy. László
(eds.) (1999), ‘Transition with Contradictions: The
Case of Hungary 1990-1998’, Kairosz, Szentendre.
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garian Democratic Forum). As a result of
the fourth free elections (held April 2002)
the present Hungarian government is com-
posed of the MSZP (Hungarian Socialist
Party) and SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Demo-
crats).
The government in Hungary is com-
posed of the Prime Minister, ministers with
and ministers without portfolio, as well as
of the Minister of the Prime Minister’s Of-
fice (PMO) – or the “Chancellery” (mod-
elled on the German system). The heads of
the different state authorities8 are not part
of the government. The number of minis-
tries has changed over the last decade. Un-
der the Orbán government there were 15
ministries (as well as two ministers without
portfolio), under the Medgyessy govern-
ment there are equally 15 although struc-
tured differently (and with no minister
without portfolio). (Table 1-2.)
As a rule, the minister of the Chan-
cellery represents the public administration.
Together with the Prime Minister the Orbán
government was composed of 18 while the
Medgyessy government is composed of 16
persons.
The Hungarian Parliament lists the
ministries in an Act. The government regu-
lates the competencies and responsibilities
of the ministers as well as the coordination
of work among them in a government
regulation. The minister heads the ministry,
the structure of which is laid down in the
ministry’s own statute. The state secretaries
and deputy state secretaries assist the min-
ister in his/her work. The political state
secretary is appointed by the government.
As “deputy ministers” they may represent
the minister before the Parliament (which
means he/she can fully represent the min-
ister during plenary and committee meet-
                                                
8 Such as the Central Statistical Office, Hungarian
Office of Patents, Office of Economic Competition,
Office of National and Ethnic Minorities, Office of
Hungarians Abroad, Public Surveillance of Financial
Institutions, Surveillance of Gambling, Directorate
General of Pensions, or the Social Security Office.
The task of these institutions is set out by the gov-
ernment and each is supervised by one of the minis-
ters.
ings), while on government meetings the
political state secretary may be present
without voting rights.
Tables 1-2
Ministries in Hungary under
the Orbán government
Area Ministry
Economic issues
Ministry of the Economy
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development
Ministry of Transport and Wa-
ter Management
Minister of PHARE programs
(without portfolio)
Human and social
issues
Ministry of Social and Family
Affairs
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Environment Pro-
tection
Ministry of Education
Ministry of National Cultural
Heritage
Ministry of Youth and Sport
Traditional state
governance issues
Prime Minister’s Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Defence
Minister of the National Secret
Service (without portfolio)
Ministries in Hungary under
the Medgyessy government
Area Ministry
Economic issues
Ministry of the Economy and
Transport
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development
Ministry of Informatics and
Telecommunication
Human and social
issues
Ministry of Employment and
Labour Policy
Ministry of Public Health,
Social and Family Affairs
Ministry of Environment Pro-
tection and Water Manage-
ment
Ministry of Education
Ministry of National Cultural
Heritage
Ministry of Children, Youth
and Sport
Traditional state
governance issues
Prime Minister’s Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Defence
Source: http://www.ekormanyzat.hu
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The administrative state secretary is
appointed for an indefinite period and is
responsible for the internal organisation of
the ministry. He/she may represent the
minister in his/her absence and in the ab-
sence of the political state secretary, except
for the parliamentary plenary sessions.
The administrative state secretary has
3-5 deputy secretaries, according to the
ministries concerned. They are appointed by
the minister upon the proposal from the
administrative state secretary. The deputy
state secretary heads the general depart-
ments subordinated to him/her. Division of
tasks among the deputy state secretaries is
organised according to the internal struc-
ture of the ministry. General departments
may be subdivided into departments. In the
ministries there is also a separate secretariat
for parliamentary relations.
The size of a ministry in terms of offi-
cials varies between 163 (Ministry of Youth
and Sport) and 1655 (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs). The average size being 300-600.9
Besides the legislative and the execu-
tive, the judiciary as the third branch of the
state defends and guarantees the constitu-
tional order and the rights of the citizens,
provides for punishment in criminal cases
and supervises the legality of acts of the
public administration. It functions at three
levels: the Supreme Court, the courts of the
capital and of all counties, and the local and
labour courts.
The European Commission acknowl-
edges the institutional stability of democ-
racy in Hungary,10 an appraisal also shared
                                                
9 According to data of the Ministry of Interior (sup-
plied upon personal request) in the second quarter of
2001 there were some 7240 officials working for the
15 ministries.
10 „In its 1997 Opinion the Commission concluded
that Hungary fulfilled the political criteria. Since that
time, the country has made considerable progress in
further consolidating and deepening the stability of
its institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities.” European Commission (2001), ’2001
Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress towards Ac-
cession’, Brussels, 13. 11. 2001, SEC(2001) 1748, p.
24.
by academic experts.11 Thus, Hungary is
regarded as an institutionally consolidated
country as far as the basic requirements of
checks and balances, separation of powers
and regular elections are concerned.
2.2. The local and regional administra-
tion – Reinforced independence?
The Hungarian Republic is traditionally a
unitary state containing 19 counties and the
capital, Budapest. There are 3158 local self-
governments.
After the systemic change from a so-
cialist regime towards a democratic political
system one of the leading principles of the
young Hungarian democracy was to give as
much freedom to local governments as pos-
sible while weakening the functions of the
counties (claimed to have served the inter-
ests of the Communist Party in the past).
Today, the result is that in legal terms the
county and the municipality are practically
on the same level in the public administra-
tion system. This liberal approach (similar
to the British or the Scandinavian model)
led however to the fragmentation of the
regulatory and planning functions of mu-
nicipalities and to the lack of coherence in
regional development.12
This problem was addressed when the
first government established the so-called
Commissioners of the Republic to supervise
the legal and functional activities of the lo-
cal governments. In 1996 the system of the
Commissioners of the Republic was abolished
and their tasks were re-located to the newly
organised organs called Offices of County
level Public Administration (for the capital
and the counties). The heads of these offices
                                                
11 See for example the Political Yearbook of Hungary
(Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve, Demokrácia Ku-
tatásokért Alapítvány, Budapest, Year) appearing
every year and containing the analyses of Hungarian
experts with summaries in English.
12 Szabó, Gábor (1994), ‘A dekoncentrált állami
közigazgatás aktuális elméleti és gyakorlati kérdései’
(Current theoretical and practical questions of de-
concentrated state administration), Info-Társadalom-
Tudomány, 31.
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are appointed by the Prime Minister upon the
proposal of the Minister of the Interior and
the Minister of the Chancellery.
Besides the functions of the counties
(which mainly enjoy some coordinative
functions and manage the institutions in
their scope: such as schools, high schools,
hospitals etc.), the state established so-called
deconcentrated organs representing differ-
ent administrative and functional tasks of
ministries or state authorities.13
Primarily with a view to Hungary’s
preparations for EU membership but also by
dint of strengthening democratic values, de-
signing regions became a high priority in the
state administration reform. First, the Law on
Regional Development and Physical Planning
(XXI/1996) was adopted in 1996 – thanks to
which the institutions of regional develop-
ment policy have gradually been set up
throughout Hungary. The key players are the
Territorial Development Councils at county
(NUTS III) levels and the Regional Develop-
ment Councils at regional (NUTS II) levels.14
The Territorial Development Councils
(TDCs) are not directly elected bodies. Mem-
bers are the chairman of the county assem-
bly, the mayors of the towns with county
rights, representatives of the ministries con-
cerned, the representatives of the local
chambers, the representatives of the associa-
tions of local governments (established for
development purposes) and the representa-
tives of the social partners at county level.
The major tasks of the county level TDCs are
to monitor and analyse the socio-economic
situation of the county, in this light to draw
up and adopt the county’s long term devel-
                                                
13 Among those are the county public administration
offices, agricultural offices, county offices of veteri-
nary, county offices for plants and land protection,
land registration offices, public health authorities,
labour offices, taxation authorities, or offices of
transport supervision – operating at county scale.
Other deconcentrated state administration organs
cover a greater territory than that of the county, or
they cover a special territorial unit, e.g. environ-
mental authorities, nature protection and national
park offices, measurement authorities, telecommuni-
cation authorities.
14 For details see: Regions of Hungary:
http://www.rda-ceda.net/partners/hungary/hung-
ary-gi.html (February 2002).
opment concept and programme, to provide
the necessary resources for those plans and to
decide on the use of the available resources.
All TDCs have established their Territorial
Development Agencies, being responsible for
the preparation and implementation of re-
gional development concepts and pro-
grammes adopted by the TDC. Thus, despite
the controversial relationship between the
government and the counties, the latter were
kept as a reference administrative level for
regional policy not least because this is a level
with long traditions and well functioning
institutions.
At the same time the regional level
(NUTS II) was created in order to be able to
manage development plans exceeding the
dimensions of a county.15 According to the
law, 7 regions have been specified in Hun-
gary: Western-Transdanubia, Middle-
Transdanubia, South-Transdanubia, Central
Hungary, South-Great-Plain, North-Great-
Plain and Northern Hungary. Each region
contains three counties, except for Central
Hungary which is composed of the capital
and Pest county. The amendment (1999) of
the Law on Regional Development defined
these 7 regions as territorial units to be eligi-
ble for the Structural Funds of the EU. Bear-
ing this in mind the Regional Development
Councils at regional level had been set up by
the end of 1999 and they also have created
their respective Regional Development Agen-
cies. The latter institutions will play an emi-
nent role in coordinating the interests of the
member-counties of the given region, bring-
ing together their representatives and medi-
ating among them.
2.3. Characteristics of the Hungarian
public administration
2.3.1. Heritage of the past and recent devel-
opments
                                                
15 Horváth, Gyula (1998), ‘Az európai regionális
politika’ (European Regional Policy), Dialóg-
Campus, Budapest–Pécs.
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The Hungarian public administration sys-
tem has long and important European tra-
ditions acquired especially under the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Monarchy.16
During socialism the public admini-
stration was controlled by the Hungarian
Socialist Labour Party (MSZMP). This meant
that strategic decisions concerning different
portfolios were taken inside the Party (via
its special sectoral committees) hand in
hand with the Office of Economic Planning.
The ministries simply had to implement
these decisions. Inside the ministries, the so-
called party secretaries were ranged on
nearly equal footing with the minister. After
1989 a radical change took place: the
making of strategic decisions (in the
framework of laws) was shifted to the Par-
liament while inside the government the
ministers regained their own competencies
regarding their specific area of responsibil-
ity (mainly proposing and implementing
laws). Thus, the democratic balance be-
tween legislation and execution was re-
stored.
After the systemic change following
the collapse of the socialist regime, settling
the status of civil servants was one of the
first concerns when building up the institu-
tions of the young democracy: the Act on
the Legal status of civil servants was
adopted in 1992 (XXIII/1992). The aim
was to reinforce the status of civil servants
by ensuring the “carrier type” system that
provides an in-built promotion possibility
for civil servants.17 The system however is
                                                
16 After the Compromise of 1867, during the so-
called Dualism foreign affairs, defence and financial
affairs were shared competencies between Austria
and Hungary. This meant a strong institutional in-
tertwining and compliance of the Hungarian central
administration with Austrian standards. This had an
important impact on the structure of ministries, on
the carrier system, handling of dossiers, internal
discipline and mentality of the bureaucrats in gen-
eral. See for example: Somogyi, Éva (1996), ‘Kor-
mányzati rendszer a dualista Habsburg Monar-
chiában’ (Governance in the dualist Habsburg Mon-
archy), História Könyvtár, Budapest.
17 Dudás, Ferenc – Hazafi, Zoltán (2000), ‘A közi-
gazgatást és annak személyi állományát érintő har-
monizációs törekvések iránya’ (Direction of Har-
not free from political influence: after every
new election the incoming governments
changed the civil servants on the higher
posts (from heads of general departments
up to the state secretary level). Therefore, in
Hungary the ‘carrier type’ system of civil
service is loosened by the ‘employment type’
system meaning that different higher-
ranking, non-political posts may be filled
with people from “outside” (backed by the
ruling coalition).
An amendment of the said Act was
adopted in 2001 and entered into force on
the 1st of July 2001. The amended law raises
the professional and ethical requirements of
civil servants and puts emphasis on their
accountability and incorruptibility. In ex-
change, the Act ensures higher remunera-
tion, and predictable promotion system, and
creates the status of top-level civil servants
too. Here the aim was to build up a layer of
some 300 highly qualified top civil servants
able to „prepare complex social-policy and
administration alternatives for the govern-
ment, taking into consideration even the
most complicated macro-level relations and
to manage the state and public administra-
tion issues related to EU integration from a
system-driven perspective.”18 The creation
of these prestigious posts might also have
the positive consequence of protecting the
position of the highest-ranking civil ser-
vants against political fluctuation and cor-
ruption.
Obviously, European integration ef-
forts played and still keep on playing a cru-
cial role in the modernisation of the Hun-
garian public administration system at na-
tional, regional, and to some extent at local
levels. In this sense Hungary and the other
post-socialist countries had the advantage of
launching modernisation with full com-
mitment to adjusting to Western European
norms, thus, guidance from OECD/EU was
                                                                         
monisation Efforts Related to the Public Administra-
tion and Its Personnel), Magyar Közigazgatás, 2000.
január, L./1.
18 National Programme for the Adoption of the Ac-
quis, Chapter B.1.
http://www.kum.hu/euanyag/NPAA/ANPfinal0705
/Public%20Administration.html (February 2002).
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easier to accept and adopt. Of course, not
only structures are reformed and new laws
adopted, but human resources also had to
be „upgraded”. As will be discussed later,
training of Hungarian officials in EU affairs
became not only a high priority of the mod-
ernisation of public administration but also
a reality appreciated by the EU institutions
too.
After 1989, as was the case in other
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the
reform of the whole public administration
was a three-stage process.19 In the first
phase the initial reform aimed to establish
the basis for democracy, rule of law and the
creating of an adequate framework for a
liberal approach to economy and society.
The second phase consisted in the consoli-
dation of the system and further continuous
adjustments to OECD/EU norms given the
opening up of these countries towards the
developed world. The third stage has al-
ready started parallel to the EU association
process, but accession negotiations and the
preparations for full EU membership have
accelerated the institutional adaptation to
European requirements at national as well
as at regional and local levels of the public
administration.
All this did not lead to a creation of a
brand new public administration, but to a
gradual adaptation of the existing system in
which basic internal structures of ministries
were maintained and many well-trained
civil servants remained in their place also
after the systemic change. Major changes,
as it was mentioned, were related to the
status of the ministries themselves. After
1990 some changes to the entry require-
ments occurred: besides a higher education
diploma, the passing of exams on civil
service is required. New administrative
units (departments, offices or state secre-
tariats) carrying responsibility for EU rela-
tions have been created. The changing con-
cepts of the different governments also gave
rise to the rather frequent re-organisation
                                                
19 PECAT Foundation (1998), ‘Assistance to Public
Administration Reform in Central and Eastern
Europe’, Warsaw.
of the ministries reflecting the given gov-
ernment’s own priorities.
2.3.2. Hungarian public administration in
figures20 – at a glance
In Hungary more than 8 per cent per cent
of the population is employed by the state
but as it is illustrated below, there are dif-
ferent categories within such a status. The
number of civil servants (112 000) might
seem surprisingly high (especially com-
pared to the Polish situation) and this can be
explained by the fact that the category of
civil servant is extended beyond the core
central administration to other public ad-
ministration organs, and that even the low-
est level desk officer is hired under the Civil
Service Act. The gender composition of the
civil service is also interesting: while there is
a clear dominance of women in general, the
share of women and men on higher posts is
evened out. While every 6th man in the
service is high-ranking, only every 15th of
the ladies reaches the same degree.
Table 3
Employees of the state
(rounded figures)
Civil servants 112 000
Public employees 579 000
On duty  90 000
Judiciary  11 000
Public workers  26 000
Total 818 000
Table 4
The share of employees of the state according to
sectors
Public administration,
Defence, Social security 291 500
Education 248 000
Public health, social services 209 500
Other  69 000
Total 818 000
Table 5
The share of women and men in the civil service
Men 33 204 (29,7%)
Women 78 542 (70,3%)
Total  111 746 (100%)
                                                
20 The data represent the situation in the first quarter
of 2000 and stem from the Central Statistical Office
and the Ministry of Interior.
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Table 6
The share of high-ranking women and men in
the civil service
Men 5650 (52,3%)
Women 5150 (47,7%)
Total  10 800 (100%)
Table 7
Share of civil servants according to institutions
State administration 66 653 (60%)
Local governments 42 988 (38%)
Non-governmental organs 1 704 (1,7%)
Public bodies 169 (0,1%)
Other 232 (0,2%)
Total  111 746 (100%)
2.4. Public administration reform: Ten-
dencies with a view to EU accession
The Hungarian strategy for the internal
preparations for EU membership is based on
four pillars:21 (1) establishing the grounds
for macroeconomic stability and sustain-
able, long term growth; (2) (in parallel to
the adoption of the acquis) the creation of
necessary institutional capacities; (3) train-
ing and re-training of civil servants with
special regard to EU knowledge and EU lan-
guages (accompanied by the training of
judges and translators); and finally (4) pre-
paring the public for EU accession (com-
munication strategy). The realisation of
these priorities is dealt with in the National
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis22
(NPAA), where one chapter is dedicated to
the public administration reform in con-
nection with applying the acquis.
Ever since the systemic change, the
aim of public administration reform was to
create an efficient and transparent state and
local administration system serving the citi-
zens. According to the NPAA 2000: “In ad-
dition to the large structural reforms, the
government considers it important to
gradually raise the efficiency of public ad-
ministration to EU standards. To this end the
                                                
21 http://www.kum.hu/euanyag/felkeszules/
felkstrat.html (February 2002)
22 http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euanyag/NPAA/
Chapters2000/c/Public_Administration.htm; p. 1.
(February 2002).
government wants to further improve the
quality of work, especially at the level of
strategic preparation of government deci-
sions, the coordination and implementation
of decisions and reliable monitoring of im-
plementation in order to promote good gov-
ernment.”23 These principles become even
more important when it is taken into ac-
count that with EU membership, a large
amount of decisions will be taken at supra-
national level and that the EU can be per-
ceived as a system of multi-level govern-
ance.24
The respective government decision
(1052/1999) concentrated on four fields:
(A) development of the national and re-
gional public administration (the strength-
ening of the Prime Minister’s Office and its
eminent role in coordinating regional gov-
ernment offices is the pre-eminent example
of this); (B) reform of local administration
(including the public administration of-
fices); (C) the modernisation of the infor-
mation system of the public administration;
(D) the support for a life-long career system
for civil servants (backed up by a significant
wage increase).
A) Reform of the national/regional public
administration
The reform of the state administration is
based on the principles of deregulation
(abolishing competence where state ad-
ministration is not necessary and can be
settled with other means) and decentralisa-
tion (state administration tasks to be carried
out as close to the citizen as possible and
relegate competencies to local levels where
possible).
As regards the ministries the aim is to
relieve them of some specific public ad-
ministration tasks, so that they can concen-
trate more on strategic planning, coordina-
                                                
23 Ibid.
24 Cf.: Marks, Gary – Hooghe, Lisbet – Blank, Kermit
(1996), ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-
Centric v. Multi-Level Governance’ Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies, 34, 3, pp. 341-378.
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tion, information, supervision and legal
regulation tasks.
The intransparent system of decon-
centrated organs and their divergent meth-
ods of operation are also under revision.
One of the self-set tasks of the gov-
ernment is the examination of opportunities
to move regional public administration to
regions rather than to counties. The ten-
dency is twofold: administrative as well as
authority-type functions are being either
decentralised from the centre and similar
tasks are shifted from the counties to the
regions25 and some of the regulatory com-
petencies are being delegated from the
counties (county public administration of-
fices) to local governments (town clerks of
municipalities).
The procedural rules of public ad-
ministration will also have to be reviewed
not only in order to enhance efficiency and
transparency but also to ensure legal rem-
edy against violation of the law, or in case
of non-compliance with Community law
after accession.
B) Reform of local administration
In practice the system of local democracy
has proved to work well during the past
decade, but the financing of local govern-
ments should be revised (the aim is to leave
more local income for them26). Also the
fragmentation of regulatory tasks should be
prevented (e.g. every local government has
the right to issue certain environmental
rules) and the “functional association” of
smaller municipalities should be further
encouraged (via integrated territorial devel-
opment programmes) in order to be able to
benefit adequately from pre-accession funds
                                                
25 If this development continues, it might become
possible to transform the development/statistical
regions into “real” electoral regions. Thus, the estab-
lishment of functional regions will precede the po-
tential establishment of democratic regions.
26 The Medgyessy government is committed to fur-
ther improve the situation of local governments and
to render their financial position more solid and
sustainable.
and, upon membership, from the Structural
Funds.
C) Modernisation of the information system
Modern telecommunication and informa-
tion technology greatly enhances the effi-
ciency of public administration. Launched
by the Horn government and continued by
the Orbán and Medgyessy governments the
“electronisation” of public administration
has advanced very well. To date every civil
servant, and secretary, has their own com-
puter. These computers are linked together
in an internal network as well as in a very
secure closed governmental network em-
bracing the Chancellery, all ministries and
state authorities. This network is primarily
used for correspondence. Every ministry
and state authority has by now built up its
database and is connected to their territorial
offices. Internet access is provided for with-
out saying. Furthermore, the continuous
training and re-training of civil servants in
information technology has become an ob-
ligation. To this end the government has set
up an IT Training Centre.
D) Enhancing the prestige of civil service,
training of civil servants
As the NPAA 2000 put it, “…the human
factor plays a decisive role in expanding the
capacity of public administration. (...) The
requirements for public servants must be
revised so that promotion and job security
are based on professional skills and the
continuous assessment of effectiveness and
performance.”27
Hungary has a Faculty of Public Ad-
ministration at the Budapest University of
Economics and Public Administration28 that
educate future public administrators and
                                                
27 http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euanyag/NPAA/
Chapters2000/c/Public_Administration.htm; p. 2.
(February 2002).
28 The formerly independent College of Public Ad-
ministration merged with the Budapest University of
Economics in 2000.
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civil servants. In practice, however, Hun-
garian civil servants enter the service with
very different diplomas. This will not
change in the foreseeable future, but the
government has introduced a new training
and re-training system ensuring a perma-
nently high level of knowledge of civil ser-
vants especially with regard to EU require-
ments.
Furthermore, a separate government
resolution of December 1998 is dealing
with the training system for civil servants
and provides for a “Training Academy” (in
fact it is run by the Hungarian Institute for
Public Administration under the Prime
Minister’s Office), which is the key institu-
tion regarding the content of the training
seminars and the examinations. The aim of
the training is to prepare the personnel of
the public administration for managing
European affairs within Hungary (while
training of officials to work in EU institu-
tions is to be launched soon). By mid-2001
special exams on EU administration have
been passed successfully by 14 000 officials.
The so-called basic exam on public admini-
stration (to become a civil servant) was ex-
tended to include EU studies too. Such basic
exams have also been passed by 14 000
people. At local level too, EU training is
taking place successfully, according to
plans.29
In parallel, EU training of judges and
translators is also proceeding in Hungary.
Hungary is open to learn from its EU part-
ners as the country is beneficiary of the
PHARE Twinning programme30 as well as of
                                                
29 http://www.kum.hu/euanyag/NPAA/ANPfinal
0705/Public%20Administration.html (February
2002).
30 Hungary benefited from 23 Twinning projects
between 1997-1999 of which 13 have been com-
pleted and 8 additional programmes have been
launched under PHARE 2000. These projects pro-
vided assistance among others in the field of agri-
culture, environment, regional development, social
policy, customs and fight against drugs. The 2001
PHARE Twinning projects (18 altogether) focus on
energy, market surveillance, agriculture, social dia-
logue, environment, justice and home affairs, re-
gional policy. These projects primarily support the
compliance with the Accession Partnerships where
national priorities of preparations for EU member-
ship are laid down. See: European Commission
OECD/PUMA and OECD/SIGMA pro-
grammes.31
In order to enhance the prestige of EU
affairs, in 1998 the government decided to
regularly transfer funds from the state
budget to the ministries to improve their
capacities to deal with EU matters. New
posts were created everywhere in the field
of EU administration as EU departments
have been enlarged. Furthermore, these
posts were made attractive for young pro-
fessionals. University students have the op-
portunity to receive a special EU scholarship
(if they are fluent in English and French) in
return for working in the civil service after
graduation. By now the prestige of working
at an EU department in the public admini-
stration is obviously higher than that of the
civil service in general, and “a strong com-
mitment towards the implementation of EU
accession can be observed in the core civil
service.”32
The NPAA was revised and resched-
uled in 200133 operating with a target date
of our EU entry in 2004, thus, listing the
remaining tasks to be completed by the end
of 2003. Here emphasis is put on institution
building especially in the following five
sectors. Agriculture: establishment of Pay-
ment Agencies, setting up of the SAPARD
Agency and the accompanying institutions
necessary for rural development. Regional
policy, cohesion: creation of central, re-
gional and local institutions necessary for
planning, programming and managing EU
conform regional development. Environ-
ment: establishment/development of differ-
ent authorities (with testing, controlling,
                                                                         
(2001), ’2001 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress
Towards EU Accession’, Brussels, 13. 11. 2001,
SEC(2001) 1748; p. 12.
31 For information on SIGMA/PUMA initiatives re-
garding Hungary see:
http://www1.oecd.org/puma/country/hungary.ht
m (March 2002).
32 Jenei, György (1999), ‘Civil Services and State
Administrations (CSSA) Country Report: Hungary’,
http://www1.oecd.org/puma/sigmaweb/acts/civils
ervice/countrypapers/Hungary99.pdf, p. 31. (Feb-
ruary 2002).
33 National Programme for the Adoption of the Ac-
quis http://www.kum.hu/euanyag/eumagyar2002/
osszefoglalo.htm (May 2002)
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monitoring, measuring, registration and
data providing capacities). Justice and
Home Affairs: reinforcement of border con-
trol, development of institutional and tech-
nical capacities related to immigration and
asylum, as well as to fight against organised
crime and terrorism. Employment and so-
cial affairs: development of institutions nec-
essary for the application of EU employ-
ment, social and health policy/standards.
These tasks must be completed during
2002-2003. The NPAA contains the de-
mand of personnel in the mentioned fields.
According to calculations in the central
public administration there is a need of ad-
ditional 7290 persons, 41 per cent of which
should be met in 2002, 59 per cent of it in
2003. 81 per cent of this demand is con-
centrated in justice and home affairs
(4000), agriculture (1252), and employ-
ment/social policy (649). The figures for
regional policy are not settled yet (estima-
tions go to 100-300 depending also on the
new government’s plans). The NPAA of
course contains the costs necessary for the
completion of the legal harmonisation and
institution building tasks and indicates the
responsible institutions (ministries, state
authorities, etc.) and the deadlines.
2.5. Assessment of the “administrative
transformation” in Hungary
Since the systemic change the Hungarian
public administration has undergone im-
portant changes. With democratisation the
ministries regained their key role in pre-
paring decisions and implementing them.
The structures of ministries did not change
dramatically, the most important changes
being the abolishment of Party Secretariats
and the creation of new administrative units
dealing with international relations – pri-
marily with European affairs.
In terms of staff the political changes
first led to a significant brain drain from the
low-paid civil service to the high-paid pri-
vate sector coupled with an initial limitation
of staff under the first government. Later
on, the civil service gradually regained its
prestige thanks to the Law on Civil Service,
and especially thanks to the changes previ-
ously outlined. Today the civil service is
becoming more and more attractive for
young well-trained Hungarians, especially
in the field of international or EU relations.
EU requirements serve as a guide in
the process of public administration reform
across all levels (from national level down
to regional and local levels).
3) EU-RELATED DECISION-MAKING:
ESTABLISHING CAPABLE POLITICAL
AND MINISTERIAL STRUCTURES
3.1. Stages of Europeanisation of the
Hungarian central administration
Regarding the process of Europeanisation34
of the Hungarian public administration
three stages35 can be identified so far.
Firstly, relations with the EC have influ-
enced the structure of the Hungarian public
administration system ever since the PHARE
programme was launched in 1989. During
this “pre-stage” of Europeanisation, PHARE
Implementation Units were set up through-
out the public administration and coordi-
nation across ministries regarding the use of
PHARE funds became necessary. To this end
an Interministerial Committee was created –
preparing the public administration for in-
                                                
34 Europeanisation can be interpreted as structures
built up to manage EU affairs and „resources in time,
personnel and money directed by current and future
member states towards the EU level.” See: Lippert,
Barbara – Umbach, Gaby – Wessels, Wolfgang
(2001), ‘Europeanisation of CEE Executives: EU
Membership as a Shaping Power’, Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy, Special Issue on executive gov-
ernance in Central and Eastern Europe, December
2001.
35 These stages are analysed in detail by Lippert, B.–
Umbach, G.–Wessels, W. (2001).
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terest-conciliation in the framework of re-
ceiving international assistance.
The next stage in this institutional
process was the coming into force of the
Europe Agreement (officially in 1994, but
the Interim Trade Agreement had already
entered into force in 1992) when not only
the joint association institutions (Association
Committee, Council, Parliamentary Com-
mittee) were set up but also inside the Hun-
garian public administration EC/EU units
have gradually been created. Until 1996 the
coordination of EU affairs was two-centred:
dossiers were divided between the Office of
European Affairs (OEA) in the Ministry of
Industry and Trade (earlier called Ministry
of International Economic Relations), and
the EU Department of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. The former dealt with trade,
economic, legal, and assistance aspects,
while the latter was responsible for the po-
litical/diplomatic relations with the EU.
This structure necessarily entailed rivalries
between the two ministries and diminished
the effectiveness of management of Euro-
pean affairs.
The third stage started in early 1996
when answers had to be elaborated to the
questionnaire of the European Commission.
Providing answers to this extensive ques-
tionnaire within only a couple of months
required highly efficient internal coordina-
tion across the whole public administration.
Therefore, early in 1996 the bi-centred
system was abolished and the former OEA
was integrated into the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs where the State Secretariat for
(European) Integration was founded,
headed by a state secretary. This mono-
centred coordination structure proved to be
far more efficient since it amalgamated both
diplomatic and sectoral expert skills; both
needed in modern international relations,
especially vis-à-vis the EU. This move not
only ensured the highest degree of synergy
during the preparations for membership but
also helped to overcome rivalries between
the two ministries and occasional overlap-
ping of competencies: factors detrimental to
efficiency. The Orbán government that
came to power in 1998 did not change this
structure – which is another positive feature
of the EU-related institutional developments
in Hungary. Negotiations on membership
and the entry into office of the Medgyessy
government further refined this system as it
will be described and analysed below.
3.2. Institutional structures and key ac-
tors
3.2.1. The key actors and their interaction
Minister of Foreign Affairs
The key person in EU affairs in Hungary is
the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is actu-
ally directing and coordinating the relations
of Hungary to the EU. As the relevant gov-
ernment decree (2179/1998) put it: “The
Minister of Foreign Affairs is leading the
accession process in its entirety and heads
the Hungarian delegation.”
The Minister represents the govern-
ment in the Association Council and –
through the head of the State Secretariat for
Integration and Trade of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs – in the Association Com-
mittee. Through the State Secretariat for
Integration and Trade the Minister has to
ensure the harmonised implementation of
integration policies, and coordinates gov-
ernmental activities regarding harmonised
preparations for the accession talks.
Additionally, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs represents all issues related to the
country’s preparations for EU membership
to the government as well as to the Parlia-
ment.
State Secretariat for Integration – State Sec-
retariat for Integration and Trade
Established by the government decree
64/1996, the State Secretariat for Integra-
tion (SSI) was set up within the Ministry of
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Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1996 and re-
mained practically unchanged under the
Orbán government. Then the structure of
the SSI was slightly modified under the
Medgyessy government since external eco-
nomic relations were also added to this ad-
ministrative unit. Thus, in the MFA to date
there is a State Secretariat for Integration
and Trade (SSIT).
Formerly the SSI, now the SSIT was/is
responsible for the coherence of the whole
European integration policy of Hungary,
both internally and externally. All proposals
for EU-related decisions must be tabled
jointly with the Head of the SSIT. The SSIT is
actually the key institution in the whole EU-
related decision-making machinery. It is a
coordination organ covering all aspects of
Hungary-EU relations, the negotiation
chapters as well as the fields of preparations
for membership. This practically means that
the SSIT is equipped with civil servants able
to coordinate dossiers of all kinds but does
not deal directly with sectoral issues.
Under the Orbán government the SSI
(see: Graph 1) was divided into two sets of
departments headed by two deputy heads of
the SSI. The heart of the SSI was the General
Department for EU Coordination which was
actually „coordinating the coordinators” of
the SSI (about 80 officials) and provided for
secretariat of the Negotiating Delegation,
the Interministerial Committee for Euro-
pean Integration and the European Integra-
tion Council.
Under the Medgyessy government the
SSIT (see: Graph 2) is also subdivided into
two sets of departments: external trade and
integration – and only the latter is directly
involved in EU matters (including EU trade
policy), while the former is dealing with all
remaining aspects of Hungary’s external
economic relations. Directly subordinated to
the head of the SSIT are two departments:
the mentioned General Department for EU
Coordination with the same responsibilities
as earlier, and the EU Communication and
Public Relations Department. On the other
hand the Department for EU Political Coop-
eration was removed from the SSIT to the
administrative unit of the Territorial De-
partments of the MFA.
Negotiating Delegation
The official screening and negotiation posi-
tions of Hungary are presented to the EU by
the Negotiating Delegation (ND) headed by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is sec-
onded by the Head of the SSI, now SSIT who
is responsible for preparing the positions of
the Hungarian government during the ne-
gotiations, he organises the work of the ND,
provides for its secretariat, and coordinates
the different internal interests. The third
key-figure at this top level is the Head of the
Hungarian Mission to the EU in Brussels. As
the Chief Negotiator, he is the operative
leader of the negotiations and substitutes for
the Minister of Foreign Affairs during inter-
governmental negotiations at COREPER
level. Furthermore, the ND is composed of
12 permanent members: the Deputy Direc-
tor for Integration Affairs of the SSIT and
ten high ranking civil servants representing
the following ministries/institutions: Min-
istry of Finance, Justice, Interior, Economy
and Transport (2 representatives), Agricul-
ture and Rural Development (2 representa-
tives), Environment Protection and Water
Management, as well as the National Com-
mittee for Norms and Standards. Addition-
ally, the Political State Secretary of the
Chancellery and the Vice-President of the
Hungarian National Bank are involved in
the work of the ND. The Negotiating Dele-
gation is rather a formal body which meets
only occasionally, when national interests
so require. Then they meet in Budapest, but
(despite the name) they never go to Brussels
together. The key role is played by the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, by the Head of SSIT
and by the Chief Negotiator.
Interministerial Committee for European
Integration
Governmental coordination is provided by
the Interministerial Committee for Euro-
pean Integration (ICEI, established by the
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government decree 1093/1994) under
which subcommittees exist. The ICEI is
composed of state secretaries, deputy state
secretaries (or heads of general depart-
ments) of ministries and the Chef de Cabi-
net of the National Secret Service. Among
the permanent invitees are the Administra-
tive State Secretary of the Chancellery, the
Director of the Office of Economic Compe-
tition, the Director of the Central Statistical
Office and the Director of the Customs Of-
fice. Chaired by the Head of SSIT the ICEI is
subordinated to the government (via the
Minister of Foreign Affairs) and has its sec-
retariat at the General Department for EU
Coordination of the SSIT.
The ICEI is a consultative (not a deci-
sion-making) forum in its own right. By
mobilising all the relevant actors of the na-
tional public administration, the major task
of the ICEI is to discuss the preparations of
all EU-related government decisions among
the ministries and to provide a forum of
interministerial cooperation. In order to be
able to complete the tasks delegated upon it,
the ICEI established special interministerial
working groups elaborating cross-
ministerial proposals.
The former working groups of the
ICEI were transformed in 1998 into expert
groups (EG) organised on the basis of the
acquis chapters (29) for conducting the
screening/negotiations process. The EGs are
headed by expert civil servants of the line
ministry (according to topics) and are com-
posed of experts of other ministries con-
cerned as well as of experts from the so-
called ministries with horizontal responsi-
bilities (Ministry of Finance, Justice, and
Foreign Affairs). The ICEI used to meet more
frequently during the screening process
accompanying the 77 screening rounds.
Presently the ICEI meets less frequently
(around three times a year) since inter-
ministerial communication has become sig-
nificantly smoother.36
                                                
36 Information based on an interview at the SSI in
January 2002.
EU departments of ministries
In the Hungarian ministries EU departments
have been gradually set up during the last
twelve years. By now every ministry has its
own EU Department (in its own right, or in
some ministries under the International
Relations Department). These units have an
important coordinating role within the
ministry concerning EU affairs.
EU departments of the ministries (state
authorities) are in charge of preparing
strategic dossiers for the ministry and de-
veloping diplomatic relations with their
counterparts in the EU. Other departments
are usually also involved in EU affairs: e.g.
the Legal Departments deal with legal har-
monisation and Departments for Interna-
tional Assistance manage EU Pre-accession
funds if available for the given ministry. The
head of the EU Department of a ministry is
the head of the Expert Group of the ICEI
and presides over its expert meetings.
As Hungary nears full membership it
continues to be the internal responsibility of
the ministries to provide an optimum size of
the staff dealing with EU matters – by re-
grouping the civil servants within the min-
istry, or by opening new posts for officials.
Minister of Justice
The Minister of Justice – in close coopera-
tion with the MFA – coordinates the legal
harmonisation process. To this end – by
inviting all the relevant ministers – he/she
puts together the national legal harmonisa-
tion programme, monitors and promotes
the implementation of this programme and
provides for the theoretical and methodo-
logical coherence of the process. The Min-
ister of Justice also has to ensure that all the
Hungarian draft-laws and regulations as
well as drafts of international treaties are
compatible with the acquis communautaire.
He/she also guarantees the coherence of
translation of Community law into Hun-
garian. All these tasks belong primarily to
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the General Department of Legal Harmoni-
sation of the Ministry of Justice.37
With a view to the huge amount of le-
gal work to be done, Hungary has had legal
harmonisation programmes since 1995.
Legal harmonisation started earlier (in ac-
cordance with Art. 67, 68 of our Europe
Agreement), but the Cannes White Paper
concerning preparations for integration into
the Internal Market38 gave new impetus to
legal approximation activities of Hungary.
After parliamentary adoption of these pro-
grammes the government is responsible for
their implementation.
The programme presently in force39
specifies the tasks of the ministries and state
authorities with regard to their EU har-
monisation obligations for 2002-2003
(government resolution 2099/2002).
These tasks must be coherent with the
obligations of Hungary deriving from the
Association Agreement, as well as those de-
riving from the country’s preparations for
EU membership in general, and as required
by the National Programme for the Adop-
tion of the Acquis and the accession nego-
tiations in particular. Initially, the legal
harmonisation programme was based on
the hypothesis that Hungary would become
a full EU member at the beginning of 2002,
thus, the final deadline set for the comple-
tion of the work was the end of 2001. How-
ever, after the European Councils in Hel-
sinki, Gothenburg, Laeken the target date
had to be moved to 2004 (as the year of
entry), and the completion of the prepara-
tions was rescheduled – as it was mentioned
– until the end of 2003.
At the beginning of each year (and
then several times again during the year)
the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs
                                                
37 Németh, Anita (2000), ‘Kis magyar joghar-
monizációs tükör’ (Small Hungarian Legal Har-
monisation Mirror), Európai Tükör, 2000. V/6.
38 European Commission (1995), ‘White Paper on
the Preparation of Associated Countries of Central
and Eastern Europe for the Community’s Internal
Market’, COM(95) 163 final.
39 http://www.im.hu/adat/letoltes/veglegesjoghar
mprogram2002_03_20.pdf (September 2002)
evaluate the work of all ministries and may
take further measures to catch up with the
deadlines of the programme, where neces-
sary. The Ministers of Justice and Foreign
Affairs draw up a quarterly report about the
timely implementation of the programme by
all ministries, and inform the government
about it when necessary.
The government regularly (at least
once a year) evaluates the progress made in
the legal harmonisation process40 and the
NPAA. While preparing draft laws, the gov-
ernment pays special attention to the tasks
arising from the preparations for member-
ship, in particular regarding commitments
made to the EU during the accession nego-
tiations.
All these measures help eliminate or
prevent serious delays in the legal har-
monisation process across the Hungarian
public administration.
Parliament
The Hungarian Parliament – via its Com-
mittee for European Integration41 – is di-
rectly involved in the implementation of the
Association Agreement thanks to the Asso-
ciation Parliamentary Committee. The Par-
liament also directly participates in the legal
harmonisation process, but is only indirectly
involved in the accession negotiations as far
as being informed about the accession ne-
                                                
40 For example on the government session in Decem-
ber 2000 the state of legal harmonisation and the
performance of each ministry was evaluated. Every
ministry having a delay in the planned harmonisa-
tion tasks had to explain the reason for the delay.
The government only accepts delays for objective
reasons (such as EU law being under modification),
otherwise any delay must be rectified as soon as
possible. Then a list was drawn up for the ministries
to catch up with their obligations. Part of the lagging
harmonisation tasks had to be concluded by the end
of January, the remaining part by the end of March.
In the beginning of April 2001 the government con-
trolled the results and could establish an overall
successful progress in the catching up process of
each ministry. (Information provided by an official
at the General Department of Legal Harmonisation of
the Ministry of Justice in January 2002.)
41 The Committee for European Integration exists as
a standing committee in the Parliament since 1994.
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gotiations. The MPs may express their views
in this regard without binding effect.42 In
general, the Parliament scrutinises the gov-
ernment’s EU-related activities. Since 1999
there is regularly – once a year, in autumn
– a day for EU debate at the plenary session
when, for example, the results of the Prog-
ress Report or current issues of accession
negotiations may be discussed. The debate is
introduced by the report of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and is concluded by the
Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the accession
process is overwhelmingly managed by the
Hungarian executive (expert civil servants
and diplomats) under political guidance of
the government of Hungary.
In a joint declaration of September
200043 all parliamentary parties agreed on
promoting legal harmonisation in the Par-
liament so that Hungary can comply with
its obligations during the accession negotia-
tions and before entering the EU. This dec-
laration should prevent blockages of EU-
related parliamentary decisions, caused by
party clashes. This agreement is to be rein-
forced by the four parties of the new Par-
liament (MSZP, SZDSZ and FIDESZ, MDF).
Within the Parliament, the Committee
for European Integration has become one of
the most prestigious parliamentary com-
mittees: it ranges as the 6th most important
committee among the 23 committees. This is
also shown by the fact that the Committee
was moved from the building of parlia-
mentary committees (and their secretariats)
to the building of the Parliament proper,
where only few committees can be found.
The most important rights of the Committee
for European Integration are: examination
of any EU-related issue, law-initiation, put-
ting forward own proposals, opinions, and
scrutinising government activities. The
Committee monitors the legal harmonisa-
                                                
42 Győri, Enikő (1998), ‘A magyar Országgyűlés
részvétele az integráció folyamatában’ (The Partici-
pation of the Hungarian Parliament in the Integra-
tion Process), Európai Szemle, 1998/1.
43 http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kulugy (see: Archives,
Earlier Statements, 11.09.2000) (February 2002).
tion process, as well as the screening and
negotiation process.44
Besides the Committee for European
Integration every standing committee has
established a sub-committee dealing with
European affairs and these are also involved
in the process of negotiations on a regular
basis.
Since the new Parliament took office
the idea of a Great Committee for European
Integration covering the dossiers of differ-
ent parliamentary committees emerged. It is
to be set up in autumn this year and is to be
presided over by the chairwoman of the
Parliament.
Prime Minister
The role of the Prime Minister is that of a
political leader. He (and the entire govern-
ment) approves major decisions, but inter-
venes only exceptionally into the technical
issues of the preparatory phase.
In order to underline the importance
of EU affairs under the Medgyessy govern-
ment an Integration Cabinet was set up
(which also existed under the Horn gov-
ernment), headed by the Prime Minister, the
vice-chairman being the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. Its members come from the MFA,
the PMO, and of several key ministries. This
is not a decision-making, but a decision-
preparing forum where every two weeks
the members outline the major conceptual
guidelines regarding the negotiations, the
national preparation, the work of individual
ministries, the preparations for a referen-
dum and the communication strategy. De-
cisions are then taken by the government.
Within the PMO three new units have
been set up concerning EU relations. The
Department of the National Development
Plan and EU Assistance (absorbing the
abolished “PHARE Ministry”); Department
of Regional Development, and finally the
                                                
44 http://www.mkogy.hu/biz/europa/bizottsag
_biztori.htm (February 2002).
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Department of Public Relations and Com-
munication.
Mission of Hungary to the EU
A further key institution of the Hungarian-
EU relations is the Hungarian Mission in
Brussels, set up in 1990. After Hungary
concluded the Association Agreement and
especially when accession negotiations
started, the Mission was extended (they
even moved to a larger building). To date,
the Mission is staffed with diplomats com-
petent in all areas of the acquis. Presently,
21 diplomats (approximately half of them
from the MFA, the rest from line ministries)
work at the Hungarian Mission to the EU.45
This number will, of course, rise substan-
tially when the Mission becomes a real
Permanent Representation of Hungary to
the EU.
As already mentioned, the Head of the
Mission is also Chief Negotiator for the ac-
cession negotiations which is a rather
unique case among the negotiating coun-
tries. The Deputy Head of Mission is re-
sponsible for the administration of the Mis-
sion itself, and for the ESDP. The Chief Ne-
gotiator is seconded by two Co-Secretaries
of the Accession Conference. One of them is
responsible for the general coordination of
the accession negotiations (meaning that he
is actually the so-called contact point for the
Commission and the member states towards
Hungary and from Hungary towards the EU
partners) and he also deals with the institu-
tional reform of the EU. The other co-
secretary is responsible for first pillar mat-
ters.
There are three sections within the
Mission, namely the Political Section, Com-
munity Policies Section, Industry and Trade
Policy Section.
The Political Section is actually headed
by the above-mentioned Deputy Head of
Mission. Under him there are five diplomats
dealing with: justice and home affairs, fight
                                                
45 http://www.humisbeu.be/themission.htm (Febru-
ary 2002).
against organised crime, terrorism and drug
trafficking, public administration and local
governments, EP-relations, press-relations,
CFSP, ESDP, Stability Pact, social policy, em-
ployment, education, public health, culture,
audio-visual policy, Community pro-
grammes.
Under the Community Policies Section
eight diplomats are working. They are re-
sponsible for: state aid, free movement of
labour, financial control budgetary issues,
statistics, legal matters, TAIEX, internal
market, economic issues, EMU, Regional
Policy, R&D, information society, agricul-
ture, fisheries, veterinary and phytosanitary
matters, transport, communication, water
management, environment protection, fi-
nancial services, direct taxation, pre-
accession funds (PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD).
Under the Industry and Trade Policy
Section four diplomats are working. Besides
dealing with trade and industrial policy,
they are in charge of general trade issues,
customs, indirect taxation, agricultural
trade, tourism, consumer protection and
SMEs-standardisation.
Diplomats working in these sections
build relations with their counterparts in
the European Commission; e.g. the Hun-
garian diplomat responsible for transport
communicates with EU officials working in
the Enlargement DG responsible for Hun-
garian transport issues. Hungarians at the
Mission may also contact the Permanent
Representations of the member states as well
as other Directorates General where offi-
cials deal with enlargement aspects.
Consultative institutions
The European Integration Council (EIC) is
composed of trade unions, chambers and
professional organisations and presently has
20 members. Subordinated to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, the EIC was established in
1998 with the aim of bringing together or-
ganisations representing the widest possible
interests while formulating national posi-
tions during accession talks. It is a consulta-
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tive forum for the social partners focussing
on European issues exclusively. Although
the government is not bound by the opinion
of the EIC, this consultation mechanism
proved to be very efficient in the past few
years.
The preparations for accession nego-
tiations are supported by the work of the
Strategic Working Group for European In-
tegration, renamed under the Medgyessy
government as Integration and Develop-
ment Working Group. It is composed of
academics and serves as a think-tank for the
decision-makers. It regularly provides
studies concerning the topics of accession
negotiations and gives assessment of the
social and economic impact of Hungary’s
EU membership. Being subordinated to the
PMO, this think tank however has a limited
impact on the formulation of the negotiat-
ing positions.
Coordination mechanisms and decision-
making
The coordination of the Hungarian acces-
sion negotiations46 is based on three princi-
ples: (1) ministerial responsibility, (2) coor-
dination across ministries with the leading
role of the State Secretariat for Integration
and Trade (SSIT) of the MFA, as well as (3)
the ‘single-channel method’ (speaking with
one voice to the EU).
Negotiating positions of Hungary are
prepared by the ministry or ministries con-
cerned, under the co-ordination formerly of
the SSI, now the SSIT.
The prepared negotiation positions
can then be discussed in the framework of
the Interministerial Committee for Euro-
pean Integration (ICEI).
Intra-ministerial conflicts are solved
within the ministry, which then must rep-
resent a single view; interministerial con-
flicts emerging at expert level can only be
solved at political level. In this process the
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(February 2002).
SSIT plays a moderate role, but of course
cannot decide. Such issues are forwarded to
the government level, where finally the
Prime Minister and his government decides.
In these cases the aim is to have a balanced
national position in which the different
sectoral interests are evened out.
At the end it is the government who
takes the ultimate decision concerning the
accession negotiations (screening and ne-
gotiation positions). The Prime Minister
decides on his own only in rare „emergency
cases” when an answer is needed urgently
from Budapest and no internal compromise
could be found. The mandates for the
screening chapters were issued via govern-
ment resolutions on the basis of the joint
proposal of the minister concerned and the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Econ-
omy and Finance. The position papers (as
well as supplementary papers) are adopted
by the government according to proposals
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The adopted positions are then pre-
sented to the intergovernmental conference
on accession by the Chief Negotiator.
3.2.2. Assessment of the key actors and the
decision-making mechanisms
In Hungary the establishment of a Ministry
for European Affairs has never been seri-
ously considered given the fact that the ac-
quis has an impact on all kinds of sectors
across all ministries. There was a political
consensus that such a ministry would not be
able to manage all EU issues in its exclusive
competence, and this would necessarily lead
to conflicts with the MFA as well as with
many other ministries. Rendering the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs responsible for EU
matters, as well as establishing the SSI/SSIT
inside the MFA proved to be a successful
decision from the point of view of effi-
ciency.
During the preparation of negotiation
positions, the interests of the different min-
istries must be adjusted before any decision
is taken. The Interministerial Committee has
been an adequate forum for this and paved
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the way for better interest conciliation
among the parties concerned during the
past decade, be it the using of EU assistance
or the elaboration of a national position in
the negotiations. The role of the ICEI might
be altered with membership when sectoral
interests of a country can be represented
directly via the Council of Ministers and its
sub-structures.
Ministers as well as directors of state
authorities must ensure the smooth imple-
mentation of EU-related tasks within their
areas of competence. They are also respon-
sible for the adequate internal institutional
set up and for establishing external relations
in the framework of their EU specification.
The Hungarian ministries may establish
(and most of them have already established)
direct contacts with Brussels, but they do it
mainly for the exchange of professional
experience.47 This type of relationship is
merely informal, since ministries are not
able or permitted to represent Hungary in
the accession process. This is the exclusive
competence of the Hungarian government –
represented by the MFA. According to both
the European Commission and the Hungar-
ian government it is important that Hun-
gary speaks with one voice vis-à-vis the EU
and not in a decentralised, uncoordinated
manner leading to mismanagement of EU
relations.
The EIC is for the time being the only
formal “lobby group” having influence on
the EU-related decisions of the Hungarian
government however the Expert Groups of
the ICEI are also obliged to contact profes-
sional groupings within their field of com-
petence before finalising a proposal. Infor-
mally some of the biggest firms directly ap-
proach the government when their specific
interests are at stake. The involvement of the
professional groups as well as of civil soci-
ety could be intensified in the future. Before
accession it would enhance the transpar-
ency of EU affairs in Hungary, and after
accession it would raise the efficiency and
legitimacy of Hungarian EU policy.
                                                
47 Information based on interviews at the SSI in De-
cember 2001.
Correspondingly, the powers of the
Parliament have to and will be extended
with EU membership thanks among other
influences to the transposition of EU direc-
tives or to the activities of COSAC (Confer-
ence of EU Committees of national parlia-
ments).
The important role of the Ministry of
Justice cannot be disputed given the fact
that European integration is based on
Community law. The Ministry of Finance
plays a key role since practically all steps
towards EU conformity generate costs.
To sum up, in Hungary the whole
process of internal preparations for EU
membership and implementation of the
acquis is decentralised to the ministries and
organs concerned although under tight co-
ordination and monitoring by the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and Justice. A smoothly
functioning Mission to the EU works along-
side the internal structures. The Mission is
already perceived by many Commission
officials as a Permanent Representation
given its transparent structure and the
Hungarian diplomats’ high-level profes-
sional preparedness in EU matters compa-
rable to that of present member states.48
3.3. Human resources in view of EU ac-
cession
3.3.1. Key persons and their professional
background
The President of the Hungarian Republic,
Ferenc Mádl, does not play an eminent role
in the country’s integration process. Nev-
ertheless it is relevant to mention that he is
professor of International and European law
and used to teach at the Law Faculty of the
ELTE University in Budapest and at the Col-
                                                
48 Assessment based on interviews conducted with
European civil servants in Brussels in September
2001.
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lege of Europe in Natolin. Thus, beyond po-
litical engagement, he also has a profes-
sional/personal commitment to EU affairs
and Hungary’s full membership of the EU.
The former Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, János Martonyi is a well-known law-
yer having specialised in European law. He
also gained diplomatic experience in the
Hungarian Trade Mission to the EC (1979-
1985) and the MFA where he was Admin-
istrative State Secretary under the first
freely elected government (led by József
Antall). Under the Horn government he
headed a law firm with EU expertise and
also taught at the College of Europe in Na-
tolin.
The present Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, László Kovács is an old-new foreign
minister having gained important experi-
ence of international and EU diplomacy
during the Horn government (1994-98). He
also did a crucial job in preparing Hun-
gary’s entry to NATO.
The Chief Negotiator, Endre Juhász is
also a lawyer and career diplomat. He was
Secretary at the Department for EC Trade
Relations of the Hungarian Trade Mission to
Belgium. In 1992-93 he headed the newly
created Office of European Affairs at the
Ministry of International Economic Rela-
tions, then working there as Administrative
State Secretary in 1993-94. When the new
government took office in 1994, the minis-
terial structure was somewhat reorganised:
the Office of European Affairs became part
of the Ministry of Industry and Trade where
Juhász was the head of the Office in the
rank of State Secretary. Since 1995 he has
been the leader of the Mission in the rank of
ambassador. He is well known for his vast
knowledge of the acquis, which is especially
recognised by his negotiating partners.49
The former head of SSI, presently
deputy head of SSIT (and head of Integra-
tion Affairs) Péter Gottfried is an economist
and career diplomat with international ex-
                                                
49 Evaluation based on interviews conducted with
European civil servants in Brussels in September
2001.
perience. From 1989 to 1995 he worked at
the Hungarian Mission to the EC/EU and
participated actively in the preparations,
negotiations and implementation of the As-
sociation Agreement. In 1996-1998 he was
the Deputy Head, since 1998 he has been
the Head of the SSI at the MFA with the
rank of State Secretary.
The present head of the SSIT, Péter
Balázs is an economist having important
experiences in both state administration (he
was State Secretary in the Ministry of In-
dustry and Trade in 1992-93) and diplo-
macy: he worked in Brussels as councillor
of trade (1982-87), then became ambassa-
dor of Hungary to Denmark and later Ger-
many (1993-2000). He was lecturing at the
Budapest University of Economics and State
Administration and published a great deal
of scientific analyses about the EU (espe-
cially the EU’s external relations).
The head of the General Department
for EU Coordination at the SSIT, Péter
Györkös is a young professional in interna-
tional relations and a career diplomat who
has been heading this department since the
1st of January 1998.
During the second half of the 1990s
the MFA engaged many young lawyers and
economists who speak Western European
languages and have an understanding of the
EU – thus, the average age at the
SSIT/Integration has dropped significantly.
The leading diplomats both at the SSIT
in Budapest or at the Mission in Brussels,
are all very competent and knowledgeable
career diplomats having at least a decade of
EC/EU experience and speaking the EU’s
working languages fluently.
In fact, Hungary’s precious asset is
that a kind of personnel continuity in EU
relations has been ensured throughout the
last decade; independent from government
changes. Hungary has a quite considerable
team (approximate figures see below) com-
posed of highly competent and committed
diplomats working together on EU accession
– and this is appreciated on the EU side,
because it signals reliability and predict-
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ability in personal relations with Hungary.50
This fact is also a proof of the national po-
litical consensus on Hungary’s EU mem-
bership and the general respect for EU ex-
pertise in the public administration and
diplomacy. It seems that the mentioned
team successfully integrated many young,
dynamic and talented diplomats, who assist
the core group in its work. Thus, the per-
sonnel continuity in key positions combined
with openness to new staff has proved to be
efficient and fruitful during the negotiation
process so far.
3.3.2. Capacities of administrative staff:
Preparing for full membership
According to estimates,51 taking all the
ministries and the Mission to the EU to-
gether, there are some 300-350 civil ser-
vants directly involved in Hungary’s
preparations for EU membership, and some
600-650 experts assisting them.52 So, alto-
gether there are around a thousand Hun-
garian civil servants and experts directly or
indirectly involved in the acces-
sion/negotiation process. EU departments of
ministries usually have an average of ten
officials.53 Nevertheless it is extremely diffi-
cult to estimate the share of civil servants in
the ministries (and state authorities) dealing
in any way with EU issues. Experts from the
Hungarian Institute of Public Administra-
tion suggested in the less involved ministries
this share might not exceed 5 per cent, but
in the more important ministries would be
over 10 per cent. Diplomats from the SSIT
even suggest that on average in relevant
                                                
50 Evaluation based on interviews conducted with
European civil servants in Brussels in September
2001.
51 Informal estimates from the Hungarian Institute
for Public Administration (HIPA) obtained in July
2001.
52 The World Bank provides similar figures: nearly
380 officials involved in the negotiations and some
690 „back up staff”. See: World Bank (2000), ‘Ready
for Europe’, Technical Paper no. 466, p. 314;
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSConte
ntServer/WDSP/IB/2000/08/14/000094946_000
72405371429/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
(February 2002).
53 The World Bank, op. cit., p. 314.
ministries (not all of them) some 50-100
civil servants might be involved in EU mat-
ters in one way or another. These estimates
would then lead to a higher number than
the previously mentioned thousand civil
servants.
For the time being – in this stage of
preparations for full membership and man-
aging accession negotiations – the indicated
number of civil servants seems to be satis-
factory to cope with all of the obligations of
Hungary. The problem regarding a possible
shortage of civil servants will arise after
becoming a member, as many of the people
presently working in Budapest will go to
Brussels to work in the EU institutions, and
also due to increased administrative tasks
stemming from full membership. Then, ac-
cording to estimates of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs – taken up also by the World
Bank – some 4000 posts will be required54
to be filled by civil servants staying in Hun-
gary and working with EU issues on a daily
basis.
The continuous training exercise of
officials and the raising of the prestige of
civil service thanks to the new Act should
reduce the difficulties in meeting the ad-
ministrative challenges posed by EU mem-
bership. Additionally, one must keep in
mind that once a country becomes a mem-
ber, the EU will affect everyday life in
nearly all fields of society. This will neces-
sarily launch a learning-by-doing process
which might not substitute, but can surely
supplement, previous training programmes,
and will surely impact on the Hungarian
public administration structures developed
so far.
Hungary is currently launching
preparations for these challenges: the MFA
recently elaborated the Program of Func-
tioning as a Member State to be adopted by
the government in autumn.55 The aim is to
prepare the civil service for the involvement
                                                
54 Ibid., p. 315. (Other experts estimate the initial
need at 2500-3000: information obtained during a
conference in Budapest in February 2002.)
55 Information obtained from the SSIT in August
2002.
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of officials in the day-to-day EU decision-
making. The Program highlights the fol-
lowing objectives:
∗ the de facto setting up of the Hungarian
Permanent Representation in Brussels by
September 2003 (the aim is to enlarge the
staff from 21 diplomats to some 50, plus
the assistance staff to some 30);
∗ redefinition of the competencies and tasks
of the SSIT;
∗ defining the tasks of the ministries and
state authorities. The primary aim is to
prepare the officials for efficient partici-
pation in the working groups of the
Commission and Council where Hungary
shall be involved already after having
signed the Accession Treaty, and will have
to cope with the challenge that not only
29 chapters but several hundreds of spe-
cial committees exist. On the other hand,
with full membership Hungary will have
to fill the unofficial “national quota” in all
EU institutions.56 Thus, the task is to pro-
vide training for those who would like to
pass the concours (application exams to
EU institutions) as well as for those who
will work on EU issues at national level.
Furthermore it will become important to
ensure smooth functioning of the public
administration after having “lost” its ex-
perts (by hiring new officials);
∗ EU Documentation Centres shall be set up
at the future Permanent Representation
and at the MFA to handle all the official
documents published by the EU.
                                                
56 According to estimations Hungary might occupy
some 340 jobs at the European Commission alone
between 2003-2008. Hungary can only calculate
along the guidelines of the Commission’s Recruit-
ment Strategy [COM (2002) 218] published earlier
this year  – but since the member states did not yet
agree on it, an official EU position in this regard is
still delaying.
3.4. Accession negotiations on environ-
ment: A case study57
The acquis screening of the Environment
chapter between Hungary and the European
Commission took place during January-
February 1999 via 3 multilateral and 3 bi-
lateral rounds. In these meetings Hungary
was represented by experts from the Minis-
try of Environment Protection and diplo-
mats from the Mission as well as officials
from the SSI, while on the EU side Commis-
sion officials from the Enlargement and En-
vironment DGs were present. Altogether
these rounds took some 15 days in Brussels.
The bilateral rounds were on opportunity to
make things clear and really prepare the
ground for negotiations with EU member
states. After the screening phase Hungary
elaborated its position paper on the chapter
by asking for 9 transition periods.
The national position was tabled to the
Council of the European Union in July
1999. Since then Hungary was twice asked
to give supplementary information which
amounted to two fifty-page detailed docu-
ments. After the second supplementary in-
formation was handed over in March 2001,
negotiations between the EU member states
and Hungary could be raised to ministerial
level. The chapter was provisionally closed
at ministerial level on the 1st of June 2001.58
By this time Hungary gradually withdrew
some derogation claims or they became
outdated. Only 4 transition periods were
retained.
As regards internal coordination, the
key forum was the „ICEI 22” named after
the number of the chapter. This interminis-
terial expert group was established in 1999
composed of officials from the Ministry of
Environment Protection, from the SSI (now
SSIT), and all related ministries or authori-
                                                
57 Based on an interview conducted with the official
responsible for environment at the SSI in December
2001.
58 On the Hungarian side a chapter can also be
closed by the Chief Negotiator who in this case rep-
resents the minister (as it happened with the Envi-
ronment chapter).
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ties (the horizontal ministries and, accord-
ing to topics others, e.g. the Ministry for
Transport and Water Management).
Meetings were held every 6-8 weeks
with some 20-40 participants, chaired by
the Head of the EU Department of the Min-
istry for Environment Protection (bearing
responsibility for the chapter). During these
years a very good, smooth and pragmatic
working relationship emerged within this
group, which continues its work after clos-
ing the chapter, by monitoring the imple-
mentation of the NPAA and also by an-
swering questions of the Commission if new
acquis emerges.
Providing the secretarial functions for
the ICEI generally means an additional co-
ordination task for the SSI/SSIT. The official
responsible for environment at the SSIT re-
ceives all the necessary documents from the
related parties and may propose amend-
ments to the papers from both a profes-
sional and a formal point of view. The offi-
cial at the SSIT as well as experts from the
Ministry of Environment Protection (now
Ministry of Environment Protection and
Water Management) keep in touch with the
Mission while the diplomat at the Mission
holds direct personal contacts with his/her
counterparts at the European Commission,
the Permanent Representations of the mem-
ber states, as well as informally with the
Missions of other candidate countries.
Current member states also provide exper-
tise via the Twinning Programme, which in
this sector proved to be very useful.
When a paper is being elaborated
some rivalry among the ministries can
sometimes be observed due to overlapping
of competencies. In these cases the SSI/SSIT
can assist the parties as a mediator. In the
end – after having solved all the problems –
final proposals are tabled to the government
which takes the ultimate decision. The ex-
perience with negotiations on environment
was that, at this level of negotiations, the
government only had to give its approval to
the well-prepared positions. This fact as
well as the fact that this difficult chapter
could be closed so early, proves that the
internal Hungarian coordination structures
were efficient, the Hungarian side was
ready to make efforts and compromises and
the EU side was also very cooperative. An
example of the latter is that the European
Commission explained to Hungary that Bu-
dapest interpreted some environment direc-
tives more severely than was necessary and
thus, Hungary could drop two derogation
claims.
As regards the future, the present co-
ordination structure seems to be an efficient
one worth retaining. The SSI modified to
become SSIT, the Mission, as well as the EU
departments of ministries will certainly
have to be extended. It is a good sign that
presently nearly all officials involved in the
background work of the negotiations and
preparations speak good English and above
their specialisation have a basic knowledge
of the EU. Thus, the major task for the fu-
ture will be the widening of expert staff
throughout the public administration with-
out substantially changing the present
structures.
3.5. Assessment of performance – Effi-
ciency, professionalism and prepar-
edness for EU membership
The Hungarian system of EU administration
– based on ministerial responsibility, coor-
dination across ministries, the leading role
of the SSIT and the single channel commu-
nication towards the EU – is performing
well and this is underpinned by two im-
portant factors.59 Firstly, the EU recognises
this system as highly efficient and recom-
mended it to other candidate countries. Sec-
ondly, if we look at the outcome of the ne-
gotiations, there has never been any prob-
lem that could have been attributed to the
internal institutional structure (such as de-
lays, misunderstandings or mistakes in ad-
ministration, etc.). Efficiency is guaranteed
also due to the previously mentioned two
principles: the system is mono-centred and
                                                
59 Evaluation of a high-ranking official interviewed
at the SSI in January 2002.
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single-channelled. The central role of the
SSIT guarantees consistency of Hungarian
EU policy and proves to be a very advanta-
geous model compared to other options (e.g.
EU Ministry). Communication with EU in-
stitutions as well as with Hungarian actors
is also coherent thanks to the single-
channel model whereby inside Hungary it is
the SSIT, and in Brussels it is the Mission,
who communicates with their counterparts.
This coordination system is of course
efficient under two conditions.60 Firstly, it
must work horizontally. In other words all
relevant parties must be involved in the
process in order to cover the whole national
spectrum of EU affairs. Secondly, coordina-
tion and communication must work verti-
cally, from the lowest level desk officer
where draft decisions are prepared up to
the government level where decisions are
taken.
It seems that the Hungarian system
comprises all these important elements and
conditions of efficiency, which greatly con-
tributes to the fact that Hungary ranks
among the well performing countries re-
garding the number of negotiating chapters
closed provisionally and also regarding the
level of preparedness for full membership.
4) CONCLUSIONS: HUNGARY - AN
ORDINARY MEMBER STATE?
When assessing the degree of Europeanisa-
tion of the Hungarian public administration
one must bear in mind that there is no sin-
gle model of public administration in EU
member states; neither is there any set of
rules of how to build up national admini-
strations to comply with EU obligations (as
was mentioned, according to the Copenha-
gen/Madrid criteria, only the existence of
reliable and sound democratic institutions
and the ability to take up and apply the ac-
                                                
60 Evaluation of a high-ranking official interviewed
at the SSI in January 2002.
quis are required). On the contrary, there is
an “autonomy of national administrative
systems, and thus, ‘structural subsidiarity’.
Day to day management of Community law
– its concrete application – is conveniently
entrusted to the appropriate national ad-
ministrative laws and relevant authorities,
which become the outer branches of the
Community’s administration.”61 What
matters is to ensure the final result:
“efficient, effective and uniform enforce-
ment of Community provisions.“62 Thus, the
only orientation point can be measuring the
compliance of Hungary with EU pre-
accession and accession requirements.
The Progress Report of the European
Commission of October 1999 analysed the
performance of the Hungarian public ad-
ministration from the prospective of apply-
ing the acquis.63 The Commission assessed
the overall performance of the Hungarian
public administration to be constantly im-
proving and the training of civil servants
was deemed as a sign of strong commitment
for complying with EU requirements.
The Progress Report 200064 noted
further progress of the administrative ca-
pacity building of Hungary.65 According to
the Commission “progress was in particular
achieved in the modernisation of the legal
environment under which public admini-
stration is operating. This concerned five
major areas: the re-definition of the func-
                                                
61 Nizzo, Carlo (1999), ‘National Public Administra-
tions and European Integration’, p. 5.
http://www1.oecd.org/puma/sigmaweb/acts/civils
ervice/docs/nizzooct2000.pdf (February 2002).
62 Nizzo, op. cit.
63 European Commission (1999), ‘The 1999 Regular
Report on Hungary’s Progress towards Accession’,
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euint/index_keydoc.html
(February 2002).
64 European Commission (2000), ‘The 2000 Regular
Report on Hungary’s Progress towards Accession’,
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euanyag/hu_en.html
(February 2002).
65 The Commission Report mentioned only a few
modifications within the executive structure of Hun-
gary, and highlighted that the aim of increasing the
financial autonomy of local governments was not
achieved. Further criticism concerned some backlogs
in organising the regional level and the necessary
structures for absorbing EU funds (especially the
delays in setting up the SAPARD Agency).
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tions and responsibilities within the minis-
tries in order to improve the operation of
the central administration; widespread use
of cost-benefit analysis in daily work; ra-
tionalisation of public services; IT develop-
ment with the aim also of ensuring the
proper link between the different territorial
offices; and development of regional and
local administrations.”66 The Commission
furthermore praised the gradual increase of
wages of civil servants and the regular EU
training of officials in the national and local
administration.
The latter aspects were re-emphasised
by the Progress Report 2001.67 Neverthe-
less, the Commission criticised the slow
progress in building up institutions neces-
sary for the future reception of Community
financial support for agriculture and re-
gional cohesion. At the same time the over-
all performance of the central coordination
via the SSI was deemed to be efficient and
the revised Hungarian NPAA was seen as a
„useful tool to reach a very high degree of
preparation for accession.”68
Further Europeanisation of the Hun-
garian public administration will necessar-
ily proceed as the country nears full EU
membership. The possible directions of
further development are already outlined in
the mentioned Program of Functioning as a
Member State. Besides the central admini-
stration Hungary is currently intensifying
efforts in the field of setting up viable insti-
tutions for absorbing the EU funds69 as well
as for applying the technical parts of the
acquis (such as border control or institu-
tions of the Internal Market, etc.).70 The
                                                
66 European Commission (2000), op. cit.
67 European Commission (2001), ‘2001 Regular
Report on Hungary’s Progress towards Accession’,
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euint/index_keydoc.html
(February 2002)
68 Ibid., pp. 110-112.
69 As regards the Pre-accession funds, Hungary was
lagging behind with setting up of the SAPARD
Agency (which should soon be accredited), at the
same time management of PHARE improved consid-
erably the last years and using ISPA assistance is also
satisfactory.
70 A further key tool for preparing the public ad-
ministration for efficient membership is the Action
Plan to strengthen Hungary’s administrative and
regional and county levels will have to pre-
pare for participating in EU structural and
cohesion policies as well as for playing an
active role in the Committee of the Regions
in Brussels. The local levels too will have to
prepare for applying the acquis relevant for
them. As mentioned, at all levels reinforcing
human capacities will be a continual obli-
gation.
The key to the future success in ad-
ministering EU affairs will be providing
competent input from the lowest levels of
bureaucracy, as well as keeping an efficient
coordination system at the top – enabling
smooth cooperation of Hungary with its EU
counterparts at all levels. In parallel to this,
parliamentary control is likely to increase
and the mechanisms of sectoral interest
representation will surely become more
sophisticated and strengthened.
So far results of administrative per-
formance suggest that in institutional terms
Hungary is on the right track towards grad-
ual adaptation to EU requirements and
should have no special institutional or ad-
ministrative problems after gaining full
membership. Hungary has good chances to
become an “ordinary” member state in the
enlarged EU as is already perceived by
many officials of the European Commission
working with Hungary on a daily basis.
                                                                         
judicial capacity – jointly agreed upon by the Euro-
pean Commission and Hungary in spring 2002. The
plan (the target zone of which points beyond our
analysis) concentrates on the following priorities:
smooth functioning of the internal market, sustain-
able living conditions in the EU, protection of Euro-
pean citizens and proper management of Commu-
nity funds.
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GRAPH 1
The structure of institutional coordination of EU affairs in Hungary under the Orbán government
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GRAPH 2
The structure of institutional coordination of EU affairs in Hungary under the Medgyessy government
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